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Abstract 
This paper provides a comprehensive overview and analysis of different options to reform the EU 
Emissions Trading System (ETS). The options discussed include changes to address the rigidity of 
supply on the auctioning side, as well as reforms to add flexibility to free allocation. Additionally, 
other options that may enhance the functionality of the EU ETS are covered, drawing on examples 
and practices in other carbon-pricing mechanisms around the world. 
It is crucial to note that any reform of the EU ETS must consist of a package of options. Taken 
separately, the options may very well have beneficial effects, but they would also leave intact clear 
imperfections in the current design. Specifically where the auctioning supply mechanism and the 
flexibility in free allocation are concerned, we assess multiple options in each category, and present 
evidence for each option. Where appropriate, we suggest complementing these reform options 
with additional elements (presented in section 3.3). 
The aim of any structural reform should be to arrive at a set of options that forms a consistent and 
credible package. With this paper, we provide an evidence-based assessment of the various build-
ing blocks of such a reform. 
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Executive Summary 
 Taking decisive steps towards a reform of the EU Emissions Trading Sys-
tem (EU ETS) is a key element in the 2030 Climate and Energy Policy 
Framework adopted by the European Council in October 2014 by 
 aiming at a more ambitious reduction of emissions, 
 preventing the risk of carbon leakage. 
This options paper aims at supporting the efforts for a reform of the EU ETS 
by putting the main reform proposals suggested so far into a coherent 
framework. The impact of these reforms, however, strongly depends on 
their exact design and implementation. 
The basic intention is not to prescribe policy initiatives but to support the 
evaluation of various reform options that have emerged so far. 
One final, but essential remark. The different ideas that are being examined 
below may or may not make sense when taken individually. What is needed 
is a package of measures that will make the EU ETS become an instrument 
that can deliver results in a realistic way, and contribute to the EU goals for 
energy and climate. 
 
Lessons learned from the current state of the EU ETS 
What the EU ETS has de-
livered 
The EU ETS has managed to implement a functioning market infrastructure 
for more than 11,000 installations and 3,000 aircraft operators. This is man-
ifested in a liquid market with a transparent carbon price signal. The system 
will deliver the intended emissions cap and will thus ensure that the ex-ante 
environmental target is met.  
However, the objective of a cap and trade system to deliver a price signal 
that recognises GHG scarcity up to 2050 has not yet been sufficiently 
achieved. The gap between projections and realisation of emissions re-
sulted in an oversupply of emissions allowances from the EU ETS beyond 
what can be considered a well-balanced market. 
 
The current imbalance of 
the carbon market under-
mines the credibility of the 
EU ETS 
A major symptom of the EU ETS is the huge imbalance between the supply, 
consisting of EU allowances (EUAs) plus international credits, and the de-
mand for such emissions allowances. This is the result of the lack of flexi-
bility on the supply side of the market, both in auctioning as well as free 
allocation. As shown in Figure 0-1 the surplus of allowances in the carbon 
market amounts currently to more than one year’s emissions of the sectors 
covered.  
Although it is recognised that the carbon market needs, in the short-term, 
allowances in excess of covering verified emissions in order to ensure li-
quidity, there is widespread consensus that the current excess supply is 
way too high. 
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Figure 0-1 Annual and cumulated net supply of allowances 
  
Source: European Environment Data and European Union Transaction Log, own calculations. 
 
The decline of the carbon 
price and its causes  
A consequence of this surplus of allowances is a low carbon price, as 
shown in Figure 0-2, which prevents the price signal from reflecting scarcity 
of allowances up to 2050 and undermines incentives for investment and 
deployment of low-carbon technologies.  
The main cause of the decline of the carbon price is the lack of supply- side 
elasticity which was not built into the regulatory design of the EU ETS. Sur-
pluses and a low carbon price illustrate the impact of uncertainties (e.g. with 
respect to economic growth) and unexpected events (e.g. the large supply 
of CERs and ERUs). Reform options of the EU ETS thus need to address 
the causes of the outcome of the ETS compared to the expected perfor-
mance. 
 
Figure 0-2 Spot price of European Emission Allowances (EUAs) 
 
Source: EEX. 
 
Concerns about carbon 
leakage 
Energy-intensive industries, which account for about a quarter of current 
emissions in the EU ETS, are concerned about carbon leakage, the reloca-
tion of production and investments to countries not subject to this trading 
system or comparable regulation. So far carbon leakage has not been a 
severe issue for a number of reasons, including the economic recession 
and efficacy of measures put in place by the EU ETS Directive. This might 
change, however, when the market faces more stringency. 
A related issue is the role of the carbon leakage list in the current set-up for 
allocating free allowances, which is based on historical production levels 
and also contributed to the lack of supply-side flexibility. 
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Evaluation of the reform options proposed by the European Commission 
 Currently the following reform options are either being implemented or sug-
gested by the European Commission: 
 Postponement of the auctioning of allowances under the so-called 
backloading procedure 
 A more ambitious reduction path of emissions after 2020 
 A rule-based response to lack of flexibility in auctioning allowances, un-
der a mechanism coined Market Stability Reserve (MSR). 
 
Postponing the auctioning 
of allowances 
In reaction to the surplus of allowances at the beginning of the third trading 
period in 2013, a decision was made to postpone the auctioning of 900 mil-
lion allowances until 2019 and 2020, expecting that demand would pick up 
until the end of the third trading period.  
 
A more ambitious reduc-
tion path 
The European Commission proposed and the European Council supported 
in October 2014 the increase of the linear reduction factor of emissions in 
the EU ETS from the current 1.74 percent per annum to 2.2 percent after 
2020. 
 
A rule-based flexible sup-
ply mechanism respond-
ing to market imbalances 
In order to address the persistent market surpluses because of the lack of 
supply-side flexibility, the European Commission proposed the Market Sta-
bility Reserve as a permanent and predictable measure. Starting after 
Phase 3 in 2021, this is a rule- based mechanism: 
 The mechanism adds 12 percent of the total surplus of allowances to a 
reserve in year t, if this surplus in year t-2 is higher than 833 million al-
lowances and 
 Provides 100 million allowances from the reserve and adds them to fu-
ture auction volumes provided the total surplus is below 400 million al-
lowances. 
 
Continued surplus of al-
lowances expected 
Our simulations of the expected impact of the backloading procedure and 
the Market Stability Reserve as proposed by the Commission provide the 
following evidence as shown in Figure 0-3: 
 Due to the expected low economic activity over the coming years and 
the reinjection of the withdrawn allowances under the backloading pro-
cedure, the cumulated net surplus is expected to increase further up to 
2020. 
 The Market Stability Reserve mechanism, which in the Commission’s 
proposal is scheduled to start in 2021, will need many more years to 
reduce the accumulated surplus in order to reach the upper interven-
tion level of this mechanism. 
These results are robust with respect to variations of our economic refer-
ence path with annual GDP growth rates of 0.5 percent until 2020 and 1.0 
percent afterwards. 
 
Figure 0-3 Simulating the impact of backloading and the original Commission’s proposal for  
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a Market Stability Reserve 
 
Source: European Environment Data and European Union Transaction Log, own calculations. 
 
Options for a structural reform of the EU ETS 
 Most of the current deficiencies of the EU ETS result from rigid supply of 
free and auctioned allowanced as shown in Figure 0-4. Actual emissions, 
however, remained, over almost all years, below this supply. Together with 
a significant inflow of international credits this has resulted in a cumulated 
surplus of more than one year’s emissions. 
 
Figure 0-4 The basic fixed supply design of the EU ETS 
 
Source: Authors. 
 
Framing the options for a 
structural reform 
Starting with the current proposals from the European Commission, a num-
ber of suggestions for a comprehensive reform of the EU ETS have 
emerged.  
By framing these options for a structural reform into three packages, we 
want to indicate actions that might progressively change and extend the 
current set-up of the system. These reform packages can be summarised 
by their intentions: 
 Stabilising the market for emission allowances 
 Adding flexibility and a long-term perspective to allocations 
 Enhancing further the functionality of the EU ETS 
 
Reform Package 1: 
Addressing auctioning ri-
gidity and ‘resetting’ the 
market 
A flexible supply mechanism such as the Market Stability Reserve (MSR) 
responds to a lack of flexibility in the supply side of the market design. De-
pending on the design features it can address past imbalances in the car-
bon market. It is essentially intended to shield the market against disturb-
ances from economic cycles, as well as other unexpected influences on the 
quantitative stringency of allowances. 
Figure 0-5 indicates that this mechanism responds to events described 
above, by varying the auctioning volume, via additions to the MSR, or re-
injections from the MSR. The parameters that determine the size of the in-
terventions via the MSR need to be carefully examined. 
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Figure 0-5 Flexible supply with a Market Stability Reserve mechanism 
  
Source: Authors. 
 
 Our simulations indicate that an MSR based on the parameters suggested 
by the European Commission will not be able to deal with the huge accu-
mulated surplus of allowances and achieve a stringency of the carbon mar-
ket which provides price signals to 2050. This may include changes in op-
erational patterns, as well as the development and deployment of low-car-
bon technologies. The following reform option would reflect a more ambi-
tious design for an MSR: 
 No re-injection of withdrawn allowances 
According to the backloading procedure, starting with 2014, 900 million 
allowances are withdrawn by 2016. The allowances are not re-injected 
but put into the MSR. In addition unused allowances are transferred 
into the MSR. 
 Early start of the Market Stability Reserve 
The Market Stability Reserve is implemented 2019, which is an earlier 
start than suggested by the parameters given by the European Com-
mission. 
Figure 0-6 indicates that such a reform package would avoid a further in-
crease of the already huge surplus of allowances and, in addition, would 
achieve more rapidly a tightening of the stringency in the carbon market, 
which would lead to a pathway to the 2050 target. 
 
Figure 0-6 Simulation of an early start of European Commission Market Stability Reserve without re-
injection of withdrawn and unused allowances 
 
Source: European Environment Data and European Union Transaction Log, own calculations. 
 
Reform Package 2: 
Adding flexibility to allo-
cations in view of a long-
term target path reflecting 
scarcity up to 2050 
Investment decisions typically require a longer planning horizon, which can 
be provided by a long-term emissions target path beyond fixed trading peri-
ods as proposed by the European Commission: 
 Long-term emissions target path. 
The current linear reduction path of 1.74 percent per year up to 2020 is 
extended after 2020 with an enhanced reduction factor of 2.2 percent 
per year, leaving the endpoint of this target path open. 
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The October Council conclusions indicate that the ratio of auctioned allow-
ances should remain unchanged. However, adding flexibility to the allocation 
of allowances needs to be discussed: One way to address the adverse ef-
fects from the current rigid allocation procedure is by  adding flexibility to the 
allocation of allowances: 
 Flexibility for free allowances. 
Free allocations are based on more recent activity levels and updated 
benchmarks, taking into account sectoral differences 
 Auctions are adjusted to free allocations  
in view of the emissions target path 
The auctioning volume is determined by subtracting from the target path 
volume of a specific year the amount of free allowances previously de-
termined. 
Figure 0-7 visualises this reform package. Because of the built in flexibility 
of both free allocation as well as of the auction volume, one additional new 
feature is that there is no need for a cross-sectoral correction factor, as in 
the current setting. 
In addition, fixed trading periods are no longer necessary, as the shift from 
fixed caps to a long-term target path will ensure the environmental integrity. 
This reform package lowers the risk of carbon leakage by providing investors 
with a long-term dynamic reduction target, compensates installations by tak-
ing into account output fluctuations and provides free allocation based on 
updated and realistic benchmarks. 
 
Figure 0-7 Flexible free allocations in view of a long-term target path 
  
Source: Authors. 
 
Reform Package 3: 
Enhancing the functional-
ity of the EU ETS 
A number of reform options are available which could enhance the function-
ality of the EU ETS: 
 Targeted allocation of free allowances 
The risk of carbon leakage could be addressed by explicitly compensat-
ing the exposure of export and import competition, recognising currently 
unavoidable emissions from process emissions (e.g. in the cement and 
steel industry), as well as indirect emissions from electricity through the 
allocation of free allowances, or by providing compensation from auc-
tioning revenues, possibly managed by the national electricity regulator. 
 Activating Domestic Offsets (Art 24a) 
Article 24a of the EU ETS Directive makes provisions for the use of do-
mestic (EU) credits from projects. This provision has not been used so 
far, but could provide the opportunity to allow for reductions from the 
non-ETS sector to be used in the ETS sector.  
 Different sectoral treatment within the same ETS 
Target paths which are used for determining the supply of allowances 
could differ between sectors, e.g. between industry and combustion 
sectors. 
 Different treatment of small installations 
Since 84 percent of the smaller installations account for only 10 percent 
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of total EU ETS emissions, a different treatment of the smaller installa-
tions could be considered that lowers the administrative burdens. This 
could be done with an emissions levy or the inclusion of upstream en-
ergy distributors into the EU ETS, as it is currently the case in Califor-
nia. 
 Emissions Performance Standard  
As a means to speed up the decarbonisation of the power sector, some 
voices – such as the Greens group in the EP – are calling for an emis-
sions performance standard, which would limit the amount of CO2 emit-
ted per kilowatt hour. 
 Extending sectoral coverage 
Another proposal, which was also mentioned above, is the inclusion of 
additional sectors to the EU ETS, including upstream fuel distribution. 
 Governance issues 
Reactions to undesired events on the carbon market could be speeded 
up by installing an authority in charge of observing and maintaining the 
integrity of the carbon market, not dissimilar to the Australian Climate 
Change Regulatory Authority. 
 Innovation Reserve  
The current NER 300 funding programme of innovative low-carbon en-
ergy demonstration projects could be extended both in volume and 
scope for targeted innovation policies. This is included in the Council 
Conclusions through the proposed NER400, which also covers indus-
trial sectors. 
 
Protecting against the risk of carbon leakage 
 There is emerging evidence that almost all elements of the EU ETS mech-
anism are of some relevance to the issue of carbon leakage. As a conse-
quence, all reform options need to be checked against this issue. 
Energy-intensive industries can be shielded from carbon leakage through 
the introduction of the following reform elements: 
 Using a long-term emissions target path for the supply of allowances, 
which provides the desired long-term perspectives for investment deci-
sions while keeping environmental integrity. 
 Both the supply of free and of auctioned allowances respond to output 
fluctuations. This flexibility reduces unwanted effects from the current 
rigid allocation procedures and makes a Cross-Sectoral Correction Fac-
tor redundant. 
 The behaviour of the supply side of the carbon market can be made 
more predictable through the introduction of a Market Stability Re-
serve type mechanism. 
 Free allowances can be allocated in a more targeted manner. In the 
current benchmark system this can be accomplished by updating the 
parameters for technological developments. In addition, the exposure to 
international trade, the amount of currently unavoidable process emis-
sions as well as indirect emissions from electricity, have to be explicitly 
taken into account. 
Both the response to changes in activity levels and the use of better targeted 
criteria support a scheme for free allocations that protects sectors and in-
stallations against the risk of carbon leakage. 
The insight that all elements which are relevant for a reform of the EU ETS 
have also a strong bearing on the risk of carbon leakage emphasizes a com-
prehensive instead of a piecemeal approach to this issue. 
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Benefits of a more flexible design 
 Basically all reform packages that have been put forward so far emphasise 
the benefits of more flexibility in the EU ETS. 
 Reform elements based on a Market Stability Reserve react to supply 
inflexibility. 
 Reform elements which react to output changes link the stringency of 
the carbon market to activity levels. 
Together with a long-term emissions target path, these reform elements 
eliminate the need for fixed trading periods and for a cross-sectoral correc-
tion factor. 
By compensating installations explicitly for trade exposure, process emis-
sions and indirect emissions, free allocations can be made more targeted 
and the carbon leakage list is no longer required. 
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1 The current state of the EU ETS 
The objectives of the EU 
ETS 
The EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) is intended to be the corner-
stone of the European Union’s climate policy. It is a cap-and-trade system 
whose objective is price discovery, given a target to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions in the sectors covered in the EU ETS in a cost-effectively manner 
to a long-term cap, with short-term milestones.  
The short-term milestone for the  EU ETS is a reduction of emissions in 
covered sectors by 21 percent compared to 2005 levels by 2020, and 43 
percent by 2030 (as per the October Council Conclusions). 
For 2050 the European Commission’s Energy Roadmap provides pathways 
to achieve a low-carbon economy in Europe in line with a greenhouse gas 
reduction of 80 to 90 percent. 
 
Key findings Evidence on the current state of the EU ETS include: 
 Rigidity of supply has led to the emergence of a significant surplus of 
allowances, which amounts currently to more than one year’s emis-
sions. 
 This imbalance was caused not only by European Union Allowances 
(EUAs), but also by the inflow of international credits as Certified Emis-
sions Reductions (CERs) form the Clean Development Mechanism and 
Emissions Reduction Units (ERUs) from Joint Implementation projects. 
 As a consequence of this imbalance, the carbon market does not re-
flect scarcity up to 2050, which hinders the incentives for switching to 
low-carbon technologies. 
 
1.1 The imbalance of supply and demand for allowances 
 
The declining demand for 
allowances from verified 
emissions 
The main demand from allowances originates from verified emissions which 
in 2013 amounted to 1,904 million tonnes of CO2. As can be seen from 
Figure 1-1, about 71 percent of those emissions result from installations 
whose main activity involves the combustion of fuels (for generating elec-
tricity and heat) and the remaining 29 percent are generated by industrial 
processes. 
The emissions illustrated in Figure 1-1 are adjusted by the European Com-
mission for changes in the scope of installations covered in order to allow 
comparison over time and show a declining trend since 2010. 
Additional demand for al-
lowances 
Additional demand for allowances - as compared to verified emissions of a 
particular year - results from hedging, strategic trading activities and gen-
eral liquidity requirements. 
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Figure 1-1 Demand for allowances from verified emissions 
 
Source: European Environment Data and European Union Transaction Log, own calculations. 
 
The excess supply of al-
lowances 
The supply mechanism for the EU ETS is through free allocation, auctioning 
of EUAs, as well as the availability of international credits (CERs and 
ERUs). Figure 1-2 indicates that up to 2012 most EUAs were allocated for 
free.  
International offsets, CERs (Certified Emissions Reductions from the Clean 
Development Mechanism) and ERUs (Emissions Reduction Units from 
Joint Implementation projects) constitute a major supply source towards the 
end of Phase 2 (2008 – 2012). 
Phase 3 of the EU ETS, starting in 2013, brought two major changes com-
pared to the previous trading periods: National emissions caps were re-
placed by an EU wide cap; and the share of auctioned EUAs increased in 
2013 to about 57 percent of the total supply comprising free and auctioned 
allowances. 
 
Figure 1-2 Domestic and international supply of allowances 
 
Source: European Environment Data and European Union Transaction Log, own calculations. 
 
The huge accumulated net 
surplus of allowances 
By comparing the demand for verified emissions with the supply, as illus-
trated in Figure 1-3, we realise that a significant imbalance emerged by the 
end of Period 2. 
Details about the development of this imbalance are shown in Figure 1-4. 
In 2012, the annual net surplus of allowances amounted to about 40 percent 
of emissions in this year. At the beginning of Period 3 the accumulated sur-
plus of allowances exceeds one year’s emissions. 
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Figure 1-3 Supply vs. demand of allowances 
 
Source: European Environment Data and European Union Transaction Log, own calculations. 
 
Figure 1-4 Annual and cumulated net supply of allowances 
  
Source: European Environment Data and European Union Transaction Log, own calculations. 
 
1.2 The breakdown of the carbon price 
 
The role of the price signal The EU ETS was created with the intention to provide a price signal re-
sulting from a legislated cap on GHG emissions. The overall level of the 
price signal needs to be clear, credible and consistent. 
Due to the current surplus of allowances on the market, the CO2 price has 
dropped to a level, which is not sufficient for stimulating investments in low 
carbon technologies.  
 
Figure 1-5 Spot price of European Emission Allowances (EUAs) 
 
Source: EEX.  
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1.3 The role of free allowances 
 
A shift in the role of free 
allowances with Phase 3 
In the first two trading periods, free allowances were given a key role in the 
design of the EU ETS. Figure 1-6 shows the share of free allowances in 
verified emissions, which could provide three insights: 
 In Phase 1 a significant over-allocation was observed due to a lack of 
emissions data when national allocation plans were developed. Period 
1, however, was a learning phase and the allowances could not be 
banked into the second period. This surplus is therefore not relevant 
for the current situation. 
 In Phase 2, overall, more free allowances were available than needed 
for covering the verified emissions. Three reasons contributed to the 
surplus of allowances: the economic slowdown, the inflow of foreign 
offsets, and overlapping policies for renewable energy and energy effi-
ciency. In Period 2, auctioning played a minor role (about. 3.5 percent 
of total allocation).  
 In Phase 3, the supply of allowances via auctioning was substantially 
increased. The share of free allowances dropped to 45 percent of veri-
fied emissions in 2013. 
 
Free allowances are rele-
vant for the effective car-
bon costs 
From the installations’ point of view, the share of free allowances relative to 
their emissions is – together with the carbon price – the main determinant 
for the impact of carbon costs. 
Carbon costs in turn may have the impact of shifting production and invest-
ment outside of the EU ETS covered jurisdictions, and therefore create car-
bon leakage. This takes place if carbon costs cannot be passed through 
due to global price formation. In the power sector (to a degree which is 
unclear) the pass through of carbon costs is possible. 
The share of free allowances in relation to emissions therefore plays a 
prominent role in protecting industrial sectors from adverse effects of asym-
metrical climate change policy. 
 
Figure 1-6 Share of free allocation in verified emissions – all sectors 
 
Source: European Environment Data and European Union Transaction Log, own calculations. 
 
Different allocation ap-
proaches between com-
bustion and industry sec-
tors 
Figure 1-7 shows that if we look at differences in the share of free alloca-
tions between sectors, we discover a pronounced difference between in-
stallations with combustion as main activity, which account for 71 percent 
of total emissions, and the remaining industry. 
The combustion sectors, which include electricity and heat (but also indus-
trial sectors with the activity combustion of fuels with a rated thermal input 
of more than 20 MW), were short of free allowances during all trading peri-
ods.  
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In the first year of the third trading period, the new EU-wide harmonised 
rules for free allocation came into effect. This lead to only 21 percent of 
emissions of the combustion sectors being covered by free allowances in 
2013. 
In contrast, other industry sectors received in all periods free allowances in 
excess of their emissions. Even after the reforms introduced at the begin-
ning of Period 3, this surplus persisted, and amounted to 7 percent in 2013.  
This is significantly lower than the surpluses in Phase 2, which peaked in 
2012, with 45 percent, and generated substantial windfall profits. 
 
Figure 1-7 Share of free allocation in verified emissions – combustion and industry 
 
Source: European Environment Data and European Union Transaction Log, own calculations. 
 
1.4 The decline of the emissions intensity 
 
Not only absolute emis-
sions matter but also 
emissions intensity 
The success of a cap-based emissions policy can not only be judged by the 
fulfilment of a short-term cap (e.g. to 2020), but also the price signal that it 
gives to the long-term cap (i.e. to 2050). 
This is a lesson to be learned from the EU ETS so far, since to a large extent 
the decline of emissions was caused by the rather dramatic and persistent 
economic slowdown since 2008. Compliance with the 2020 cap did not 
pose a major challenge (i.e. virtually no investment in low-carbon technolo-
gies were required, and the carbon price did not add a significant incentive 
for such investments). As such, it is questionable whether structural pro-
gress towards the long-term target (i.e. 2050), was achieved during Phase 
2.  
 
Emissions intensities de-
cline about 2 percent per 
year 
To what extent emissions reductions originate from changes in technolo-
gies can be better judged from the pattern of carbon intensity, which co-
relates emissions to a measure of economic activities, such as GDP. 
Such an indicator is depicted in Figure 1-8, which indicates a pronounced 
decline of emissions intensity (around 2% per year). Similar emissions in-
tensities can be obtained for individual sectors and installations and serve 
as a metric, e.g. for the allocation of free allowances. 
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Figure 1-8 Emissions intensity of EU ETS 
 
Source: European Environment Data and European Union Transaction Log, own calculations. 
 
1.5 Taking stock 
 
What EU ETS has 
achieved 
The EU ETS has managed to implement a functioning market infrastructure 
for more than 11,000 installations and 3,000 aircraft operators covered 
which resulted in a liquid market with a visible carbon price signal. The sys-
tem will deliver the intended emissions cap and will thus ensure that the 
environmental target is met.  
 
What has not been 
achieved yet 
However, the objective of a cap and trade system to deliver a carbon price 
signal to 2050, and encourage the deployment and development of low car-
bon technologies, as appropriate, does not seem to have been achieved 
yet.  
The initially determined cap -– based on economic projections ahead of the 
economic crisis -– for the trading periods 2008 to 2012 and 2013 to 2020 
was expected to be stringent.  
However, the gap between projections, economic realities (and real emis-
sions), combined with the impacts of overlapping policies, in particular for 
renewables, resulted in a different reality and emissions cap which was sig-
nificantly higher than the actual emissions.  
The gap between projections and actual numbers resulted in an oversupply 
of emissions allowances from the EU ETS beyond what can be considered 
a well-balanced market. 
Another factor that played an important role was a major inflow of cheaper 
international offsets, which was seen as desirable at the time when EU ETS 
was designed. 
 
The current imbalance of 
the carbon market under-
mines the credibility of EU 
ETS 
A major issue of the EU ETS is the huge imbalance between the supply of 
EU allowances (EUAs) plus international credits and the demand for emis-
sions allowances to cover verified emissions. The surplus of allowances in 
the carbon market amounts currently to more than one year’s emissions of 
the sectors covered.  
Although it is recognised that the carbon market needs, in the short-term, 
allowances in excess of covering verified, there is widespread consensus 
that the current imbalance is excessive. 
 
The decline of the carbon 
price and its causes 
A consequence of this surplus of allowances is a very low carbon price that 
no longer provides incentives for investing into low carbon technologies.  
The cause of this decline is the lack of supply-side elasticity which was not 
built into the regulatory design of the EU ETS. Surpluses and a low carbon 
price illustrate the impact of uncertainties (e.g. with respect to economic 
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growth) and unexpected events (e.g. the large supply of CERs and ERUs). 
Reform options of the EU ETS need to address the causes, and not the 
symptoms. 
 
The issue of carbon leak-
age 
Carbon leakage, the relocation of production and investments to countries 
outside of the EU ETS without similarly stringent carbon constraints, has 
always been a significant component in setting up the trading system. 
It is evident that carbon leakage is mainly an issue for energy and trade 
intensive industries which cover about one fourth of total covered emis-
sions. These industries have been allocated, so far, on an aggregated level, 
considerable more free allowances than needed for covering their emis-
sions.  
The issue of carbon leakage has shifted now to the expected design of the 
EU ETS post-2020, which might impact investment decisions already in 
progress. 
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2 Currently visible steps for a reform of the EU ETS  
2.1 First steps for a reform of the EU ETS 
 
Dealing with market imbal-
ances and protecting 
against carbon leakage 
There are at least three closely linked reasons that would call for a reform 
of the EU ETS: 
 The surplus of allowances in the carbon market currently amounts to 
more than one year’s emissions of the installations covered. 
 This surplus erodes the expected functionality of a cap-and-trade 
mechanism for stimulating cost-effective abatement activities via price 
signals. 
 Although there is no significant evidence at this time that the EU ETS 
has led to carbon leakage, there is considerable uncertainty about the 
impact post-2020. The compounding impact of the Cross-Sectoral Cor-
rection Factor (CSCF) in the current set-up also erodes the degree to 
which carbon leakage risk is mitigated before 2020. 
These considerations have triggered first steps towards reforming the EU 
ETS. Additional efforts, however, might be needed to achieve the intended 
policy impacts with this mechanism. 
 
Backloading, Market Sta-
bility Reserve, and a more 
ambitious emissions re-
duction path 
As an ad-hoc measure targeted at reducing the surplus on the carbon mar-
ket, a mechanism for changing the auctioning schedule in Phase 3 – coined 
backloading -– was implemented. This mechanism foresees a temporary 
removal of 900 million allowances from the market starting in 2014. These 
allowances will be returned to the market in 2019 and 2020.  
In addition to this ad-hoc intervention, a further measure was proposed by 
the European Commission, which is currently making its way through the 
legislative process. The Market Stability Reserve (MSR) proposal aims to 
provide flexibility to the supply side of the market and will eventually address 
current market imbalances, caused by economic cycles.  
Furthermore, the European Commission proposed a more ambitious emis-
sions reduction path, in line with the envisaged reduction target for 2050. 
 
Evaluating the impacts First results from simulations of these reforms of the EU ETS (currently 
some implemented, and some suggested) indicate: 
 The backloading procedure will have minimal impact on the market im-
balance. 
 By 2020 the market imbalance will increase further. 
 The proposed Market Stability Reserve mechanism, as proposed by 
the European Commission, might need up to ten years to establish 
stringency in the carbon market. 
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2.2 Implemented and suggested reforms by the European Commission 
2.2.1 Backloading of allowances 
Postponing the auctioning 
of allowances 
In reaction to the surplus of allowances at the beginning of the third trading 
period, a decision was made to postpone the auctioning of 900 million al-
lowances until 2019-2020, expecting that demand would pick up until the 
end of trading period 3.  
An important characteristic of this measure is that it does not reduce the 
overall number of allowances to be auctioned during phase 3 - it only 
changes the timing of auctioned allowances over the period.  
Under this so-called backloading procedure, the auction volume in 2014 will 
be 400 million allowances lower than originally planned. Additional reduc-
tions of 300 million will be introduced in 2015, and 200 million in 2016. 
These 900 million allowances will be injected back into the market, 300 mil-
lion in 2019 and 600 million in 2020. 
This backloading procedure must be seen as an ad hoc measure in the 
absence of a systemic way of addressing supply-side rigidity, which is a 
design flaw in the EU ETS. 
 
2.2.2 Market Stability Reserve (MSR) 
 In order to address the persisting market surpluses because of the lack of 
supply-side flexibility, the European Commission proposed an additional 
measure, the Market Stability Reserve (MSR). According to the original pro-
posal, the MSR should be implemented after Phase 3, starting in 2021.  
The MSR is a rule-based mechanism that: 
 adds 12% of the total surplus of allowances to a reserve in year t, if this 
surplus in year t-2 is higher than 833 million allowances and 
 provides 100 million allowances from the reserve and adds them to fu-
ture auction volumes, provided that the total surplus is below 400 mil-
lion allowances. 
Therefore, the Market Stability Reserve is a mechanism that attempts to 
introduce a rule-based flexibility mechanism for tackling unexpected devel-
opments of the EU ETS allowance balance. Its effect would be, over a 
longer time, to also reduce the accumulated historical imbalance between 
supply and demand in the EU ETS. 
The extent to which the MSR mechanism with the proposed parameters is 
able to cope with the huge accumulated surplus needs to be evaluated un-
der different scenario assumptions. 
 
2.2.3 A more ambitious reduction path 
Linear reduction path The emissions cap in Phase 3 is translated into a linear target path that 
starts in 2013 with 2,084 million allowances and decreases each year by a 
factor of 1.74 percent. This leads to emissions in 2020 that will be 21 per-
cent lower than in 2005. 
According to the 2030 Framework for Climate and Energy Policies as pro-
posed by the European Commission in January 2014 and supported by the 
European Council in October 2014, the reduction of the target path will be 
increased to 2.2 percent per year after 2020 and reduce emissions to 43 
percent below 2005 levels by 2030. 
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2.3 Projecting the demand for emissions allowances 
Projected emissions de-
pend on economic activity 
The starting point for any simulations about the impacts of various reform 
options is a projection of the emissions paths up to 2030. 
Using the historical relationship between emissions and economic activity, 
as measured by GDP, and observing the different emissions intensities be-
tween combustion and industry sectors, we obtain, for average GDP rates 
between 0 and 2 percent per annum, the emissions paths indicated in Fig-
ure 2-1. 
 
Comparing projected 
emissions with target 
paths 
In addition, the target path for emissions in Period 2, with 1.74 percent per 
annum reductions, and the enhanced target path starting in 2021 with 2.2 
percent reductions, were added. 
The value of 2,084 million tonnes of the target path in 2013 is normalised 
to 100, and all other series are adjusted to this normalisation. 
Based on these emissions projections, a number of simulations will be per-
formed in order to obtain a better understanding of the steps needed for an 
effective reform of the design of the EU ETS. 
As a reference path for the emissions, we assume a GDP growth of 0.5% 
to 2020, and 1.0%afterwards. 
 
Continued surplus of al-
lowances expected 
When comparing the projected emissions to the target paths, we end up 
with a continuation of the surplus of allowances. This surplus amounts to 
about 9 percent at the beginning of Period 3. This surplus may continue well 
beyond 2020, depending on the actual GDP rates. 
 
Figure 2-1 Projected emissions and emissions target path until 2030 
 
Source: European Environment Data and European Union Transaction Log, own calculations. 
 
2.4 Unused Phase 3 allowances 
Additional unused allow-
ances 
Ecofys (2015) pointed out that unused allowances from the New Entrants’ 
Reserve (NER) and from installations producing at low capacities might add 
up to a volume from 500 to 900 million by 2020. 
According to the EU ETS Directive and Auctioning Regulation this volumes 
are to be auctioned in 2020, adding to the expected surplus by the end of 
Phase 3. Some MEPs have called for the transfer of these allowances to 
the proposed MSR. 
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3 Scanning the options for a structural reform of the EU ETS 
 
Identifying three packages 
for a structural reform 
Since the current European Commission proposals may not to be sufficient 
to handle the existing deficiencies of the EU ETS, which if allowed to con-
tinue may become existential, a number of suggestions for a comprehen-
sive structural reform have emerged. 
These proposals build on the reform options of the European Commission 
and add suggestions in particular from the CEPS Carbon Market Forum, 
CDC Climat, Climate Strategies, Ecofys, Euro-CASE, Fondazione Eni En-
rico Mattei (FEEM), the Austrian Institute of Economic Research (WIFO) 
and the Wegener Center at the University of Graz (WegCenter). 
By framing these options for a structural reform of the EU ETS into three 
packages we want to indicate actions which progressively might change the 
EU ETS, as currently set up: 
1. Addressing auctioning rigidity and ‘resetting’ the market 
2. Adding flexibility to allocations in view of a long-term target path 
reflecting scarcity up to 2050 
3. Further elements to enhance the functionality of the EU ETS 
Within each package we identify key options of a reform. The impact of 
these reforms, however, strongly depends on their exact design, and imple-
mentation. 
 
Evaluating the impact of 
the reform packages 
These reform packages will be assessed with respect to a number of crite-
ria, which include 
 meeting the environmental objective set by the EU, 
 providing a price signal that recognises the long-term environmental 
objective, 
 ensuring a well-functioning market, 
 rules for dealing with carbon leakage, and 
 political feasibility. 
 
Choosing reform strate-
gies 
From this menu of reform packages single options may be picked, or put 
together to form strategies for a structural reform package. 
The comprehensive framework in which the reform packages will be ana-
lyzed should facilitate an assessment of the chosen reform strategies. 
 
3.1 Reform Package 1:  
Addressing auctioning rigidity and ‘resetting’ the market 
 
3.1.1 Why a flexible supply mechanism is needed 
Responding to unex-
pected demand and sup-
ply developments 
The current set-up of the EU ETS is not able to respond to unexpected and 
major variations in demand, such as the ones resulting from the economic 
crisis, as well as from overlapping policies for renewables and energy effi-
ciency. The system also cannot respond to unexpected supply movements, 
such as the inflow of international offsets. 
The resulting imbalances can be addressed by a flexibility supply mecha-
nism, such as the Market Stability Reserve (MSR) proposed by the Euro-
pean commission.  
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Design options for a flexi-
ble supply mechanism 
Part of the supply for the carbon market can be varied by changing the 
volume of auctioning and/or the volume of free allowances. A reaction could 
be tied to: 
 the market imbalances, i.e. the accumulated surpluses or deficits of al-
lowances, 
 the market stringency, i.e. the differences between target emissions 
and actual emission, or 
 the market price, i.e. deviations of the actual price from a target price 
range. 
 
A preference for volume-
based supply responses 
In Europe a preference seems to be given to supply mechanisms that are 
triggered by volume-related indicators, in contrast to price-related indica-
tors. One is that carbon prices are not only influenced by the market funda-
mentals of supply and demand, but also, to a large extent, by speculative 
movements.  
Other reasons are related to the EU institutional and fiscal architecture, 
which would make it difficult to introduce in the EU a price trigger, as cur-
rently introduced in California. Finally, rule-based interventions on the basis 
of quantity are seen by many as more befitting of a market mechanism. 
 
3.1.2 EU ETS reform proposals of the European Commission 
 The starting point for the evaluation of various reform options for the EU 
ETS is the current set of reform options proposed by the European Com-
mission: 
 a flexible supply mechanism, coined Market Stability Reserve 
 a more ambitious emissions reduction path 
Already implemented is a temporary shift of the auctioning of allowances 
towards the end of Period 3. 
Reform Option 1.1: Market stabilisation based on the backloading procedure and the 
Commission’s Market Stability Reserve proposal 
The backloading proce-
dure until 2020 and the 
Market Stability Reserve 
as proposed by the Euro-
pean Commission after-
wards 
The following reform measures are planned, or have been implemented: 
 From 2014 to 2020 the backloading procedure shifts the auctioning vol-
ume in Period 3 towards the end. 
 The target path that reduces the emissions cap from 1.74 percent per 
year is increased to 2.2 percent after 2020. 
 A flexible supply mechanism is installed after 2020 according to the 
Market Stability Reserve with parameters as suggested by the Euro-
pean Commission. 
 
The simulated impacts The simulation of this reform option serves as a reference for comparisons 
with other options that could be considered. It fully assumes the imple-
mented backloading with the parameters proposed by the Commission. 
Two insights unfold. First, the backloading procedure will only marginally 
reduce the current surplus, and by 2020 this surplus will rather dramatically 
build up. Secondly, the implementation of the MSR might need almost ten 
years to bring the surplus within the bandwidth of the MSR. 
There are two reasons for this rather limited impact. First, it is the continu-
ation of surpluses of allowances over the next ten years, due to the low 
expected economic activity. Secondly, the withdrawal rate of the MSR is 
very low. 
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Figure 3-1 Simulation 1 - Impact of backloading and Market Stability Reserve 
 
Source: European Environment Data and European Union Transaction Log, own calculations. 
 
Pros and cons A flexible supply mechanism, as the currently proposed MSR, will shield the 
carbon market against economic fluctuations of unusual severity, as well as 
other unexpected influences on the quantitative stringency of allowances. 
The added flexible supply option in the design of the EU ETS  acknowl-
edges uncertainties on future developments 
The impact of the flexible supply mechanism should also translate into a 
carbon price signal more consistent with the long-term scarcity (to 2050). 
The added flexible supply option in the design of the EU ETS thus repre-
sents a hybrid system which acknowledges uncertainties on future devel-
opments 
The flexibility of the MSR is limited by the volume needed for auctioning 
which in 2013 accounted for 57 percent of EUAs. Reducing this share to 45 
percent because of subtracting 12 percentage points from a withdrawal of 
allowances according to the MSR still maintains a substantial auctioning 
volume but has only a modest impact on reducing the accumulated surplus. 
As a significant result from the first simulation thus emerges the insight that 
different parameters for market stabilisation might be needed for handling 
the accumulated surplus of past trading periods and upcoming market im-
balances. 
Also the use of an upper and lower bound for intervention is not evident 
since this might create unwanted boundary reactions. 
3.1.3 Extended reform proposals for a Market Stability Reserve 
 Based on the experiences of the first simulation that analyses the impacts 
of the reforms proposed by the European Commission, we develop three 
extended reform proposals for stabilising the carbon market. 
 
No reinjection of with-
drawn allowances 
The first extension suggests that the allowances withdrawn from the market 
between 2014 and 2016 according to the backloading procedure are not re-
injected in the auctioning schedule, but put into the MSR. 
 
Reform Option 1.2: Market stabilisation with Commission’s Market Stability Reserve 
proposal without reinjection of backloaded allowances 
No reinjection of allow-
ances until 2020 and the 
Market Stability Reserve 
as proposed by the Euro-
pean Commission after-
ward 
According to the backloading procedure, starting with 2014 900 million al-
lowances are withdrawn by 2016. The allowances are not re-injected but 
put into the MSR. 
Starting with 2021 he Market Stability Reserve is implemented according to 
the parameters suggested by the European Commission. 
The simulated impacts In this second simulation we assume that the allowances taken out of the 
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market via the backloading procedure will not be re-injected into the auc-
tioning schedule. 
It is visible from Figure 3-2 that this significantly lowers the peak of the ac-
cumulated surplus, and enables the MSR to enter the acceptable number 
of EUAs on the market earlier. 
Figure 3-2 Simulation 2: Market Stability Reserve without re-injection of withdrawn allowances 
 
Source: European Environment Data and European Union Transaction Log, own calculations. 
 
Pros and cons Putting the 900 million allowances that are withdrawn between 2014 and 
2016 into the MSR has a stabilising impact on the cumulative surplus, but 
requires more than ten years to bring the market surplus to the upper 
boundary of the MSR. 
This reform option lowers, however, expected, and unjustifiable price vola-
tility towards the end of Phase 3. 
 
Motivation for an early 
start of MSR 
The evidence obtained from the previous simulation motivates in a third 
simulation to investigate in addition the impact of an early start of the MSR 
in 2019 and a transfer of unused allowances into the reserve. 
 
Reform Option 1.3: Market stabilisation with early start of Commission’s Market 
Stability Reserve proposal without backloading of withdrawn and unused allowances 
900 million allowances are 
withdrawn until 2016 and 
early start of Market Sta-
bility Reserve as pro-
posed by the European 
Commission is 2017 
According to the backloading procedure, starting with 2014 900 million al-
lowances are withdrawn by 2016. The allowances are not re-injected but 
put into the MSR. In addition unused allowances are transferred to the 
MSR. 
The MSR is implemented in 2019 according to the parameters in the EC 
proposal. 
  
The simulated impacts The reform steps considered so far indicate the need for treating the accu-
mulated surplus with more ambition. This is done in the third simulation 
which implements the MSR already in 2019 and transfers also unused al-
lowances into the MSR. 
The results can be judged from Figure 3-3 and reveal that this reform option 
will avoid a further increase of the accumulated surplus. It might take, how-
ever, still up to 2025 until this surplus meets the upper bound of the MSR. 
 
 
Figure 3-3 Simulation 3 - Early start of European Commission Market Stability Reserve without re-
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injection of withdrawn and unused allowances 
 
Source: European Environment Data and European Union Transaction Log, own calculations. 
  
Pros and cons An early start of the MSR without re-injecting the withdrawn and unused will 
not prevent an increase of the cumulative market surplus up to 2020, alt-
hough at lower volume. This, therefore, will not be sufficient for creating a 
price signal that drives investment decisions to reach the 2050 target. 
 
3.1.4 Conclusions from stabilising the market for emissions allowances  
Avoiding adverse effects 
from market imbalances 
Market Stability Reserve type mechanisms are able to deal with market im-
balances which might create adverse effects. Persistent surpluses of allow-
ances blur the carbon price. 
 
Differentiating between 
past and upcoming mar-
ket imbalances 
The proposed designs differentiate between excessive market imbalances 
that originated from previous trading periods and the market imbalances 
from upcoming unexpected market development. Because of the significant 
surplus which currently exists, an MSR mechanism will need time to reduce 
the impact of past imbalances. In addition, therefore, a one-time action that 
removes these allowances from the market may be considered. 
 
Flexible supply via adjust-
ment of auctioning vol-
ume 
All interventions are made via changing the volume for auctioning and book-
ing additions or withdrawals of allowances into the MSR. There is no can-
cellation of allowances. 
No further changes in the current design of the EU ETS are needed, as free 
allocations and fixed trading periods remain unchanged. 
 
Open issues: liquidity re-
quirements and price im-
pacts 
There are at least two issues with the MSR which require further discus-
sions. One concerns the parameters which are related to liquidity require-
ments of the market. The other is the uncertain impact on the carbon price. 
The liquidity issue is mainly linked to the hedging behaviour of market par-
ticipants, in particular the producers of electricity. 
It is fair to say that any predictions about the impact of a Market Stability 
Reserve on the carbon price are highly uncertain. 
 
The need for a political 
consensus 
A main obstacle for implementing such an effective MSR might be the lack 
of political consensus which again depends on the commitment to generate 
stringency on the carbon market in expectation of a credible price signal. 
 
What’s new 
  With a Market Stability Reserve type mechanism attempts are made to 
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cope with the historic and upcoming market imbalances. 
 This rule-based flexible supply responds by adjusting the auctioning 
volume. 
 No allowances are cancelled but put into a reserve and taken out when 
needed. 
3.2 Reform Package 2: Adding flexibility to allocations in view of a long-term 
target path, reflecting scarcity up to 2050 
 
Dealing with vertical and 
horizontal imbalances on 
the carbon market 
An MSR-type flexible supply mechanism addresses above all discrepancies 
between the supply and demand of the total market of allowances (between 
what was expected and what is actually happening). This may be coined as 
“vertical imbalances” since they aggregate bottom-up all installations of all 
sectors covered by the system. 
Additional imbalances occur, however, also between installations because 
of the rigidity in the allocation of free allowances which is based mainly on 
historic benchmarks and historic activity levels.  
Since the allocation of free allowances within certain thresholds does not 
respond to output fluctuations, this might also have a distorting impact on 
the competitive positions among installations.  
This problem emerges when the entitlement for free allocations for installa-
tions in a particular sector remain unchanged although activity levels among 
installations exhibit different dynamics. 
These imbalances between installations can be coined as “horizontal” and 
motivate a second reform package, which addresses options for flexible al-
locations which are guided by a long-term target path. 
 
3.2.1 Providing a long-term perspective for emissions reductions 
Investment decisions re-
quire a longer planning 
horizon than the currently 
used trading periods 
The set-up of the cap and trade mechanism of the EU ETS is characterised 
by emissions caps for fixed trading periods, currently spanning from 2013 
to 2020.  
Investment decisions typically require a longer planning horizon, which can 
be provided by a long-term emissions target path beyond fixed trading pe-
riods. 
 An emissions reduction path is already implemented for Period 3 where the 
emissions cap is translated into a linear reduction path of 1.74 percent per 
year up to 2020. This path starts with emissions of 2,084 million in 2013. 
The European Council supported in October 2014 a proposal by the Euro-
pean Commission to extend this path post-2020, with an enhanced reduc-
tion of 2.2 percent per year, leaving the endpoint of this target path open. 
 
Reform Option 2.1:A long-term target path for emissions defines the emissions caps 
Providing a perspective 
beyond fixed trading peri-
ods 
The emissions reduction path of Period 3 that starts with 2,084 million in 
2013, and declines at a rate of 1.74% per year to 2020. It is then extended 
post 2020, with a reduction of 2.2% per year. 
Depending on the implementation of flexible supply options in the EU ETS, 
this emissions reduction path may replace fixed trading periods. 
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Figure 3-4 Long-term target path 
 
Source: Authors. 
 
Pros and cons Such a target path reflects the long-run ambition of EU energy and climate 
policy, and implicitly defines an emissions cap and the long-term perspec-
tives for installations. 
With the introduction of such a target path designs can be thought of that 
need no explicit trading periods. 
 
3.2.2 The current set-up for allocating allowances 
The rigid framework for 
free and auctioned allow-
ances 
Supply of allowances originates both from auctioning and from free alloca-
tions.  
According to the cap-based design the allocation starts from an overall cap 
which for Period 3 is defined by a linear emissions reduction path that starts 
in 2013 with 2,084 million and declines until 2020 by 1.74 percent per year. 
For each year the emissions target is divided between the allowances that 
are allocated for free, and allowances that are auctioned. Thus, within a 
trading period, for each year both the volume for free and auctioned allow-
ances is mainly predetermined. 
 
The basic allocation pro-
cedure for free allowances 
The amount of free allowances is basically determined by historical produc-
tion levels, combined with benchmarks, which are defined as emissions in-
tensities: 
free allocation = benchmark x activity level 
 
Determination of bench-
marks 
In the current set-up of EU ETS the procedure for free allocations is based 
on benchmarks which are related to emissions intensities. Each installation 
reports for a benchmark reference period emissions and activity levels. Us-
ing this information, emissions intensities are calculated and ranked.  
Depending on the position of an installation in the range of emissions inten-
sities of all installations considered, the share of free allowances per unit of 
activity is determined. Top performing installations with a low emissions in-
tensity ratio obtain 100 percent free allowances while the remaining instal-
lations depending on their ranking receive less. This procedure therefore 
contains a reward element. 
 
The use of historic bench-
marks and historic activi-
ties requires a cross-sec-
toral correction factor 
In the current set-up of the EU ETS historic benchmarks and historic activity 
levels dominate the allocation procedure for free allowances.  
The procedure for allocating free allowances therefore looks like this: 
free allocation = historic benchmark x historic activity level x 
                          cross-sectoral correction factor 
The total volume of free allowances calculated by historic benchmark times 
historic activity level will exceed the overall cap for free allowances and 
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therefore a uniform reduction by what is called a Cross-Sectoral Correction 
Factor (CSCF) is applied. This correction factor started with 5.73 percent in 
2013 and increases gradually to 17.56 percent in 2020.  
Figure 3-5 depicts the current rigid scheme for allocating free and auctioned 
allowances. 
Figure 3-5 The current rigid set-up for allocating allowances 
 
Source: Authors. 
 
Carbon Leakage List con-
tains sectors eligible for 
free allocations 
Industry sectors are eligible for free allocations if they pass the trade and 
carbon cost criteria thresholds for entering the Carbon Leakage List which 
was updated in October 2014. Since 164 out of 175 sectors are now on this 
list, it is considered as being rather unfocused. 
3.2.3 Adding flexibility in allocating free allowances 
 
Motivation and recommendations of the European Council 
Flexibility in free alloca-
tions for preventing car-
bon leakage 
Reform options addressing the allocation of free allowances propose a 
more realistic reflection of activity levels, updated benchmarks, and a more 
targeted approach for calculating the volume of free allowances. 
These reform options are intended to stabilise expectations with respect to 
the stringency of allowances on all levels of the EU ETS, from installations, 
to sectors and the overall carbon market. In addition, such flexibility should 
avoid cost distortions among installations, and shield against carbon leak-
age risks. 
 
Recommendations of the 
European Council 
The following guidelines for adding more flexibility to free allocations can be 
found in the Council Conclusions of October 2014: 
 Free allocations will continue after 2020 
 Benchmarks for free allocations will be periodically reviewed 
 Future allocations will ensure better alignment with changing produc-
tion levels and thus also combat carbon leakage more efficiently 
 Direct and indirect carbon costs will be taken into account 
 Administrative complexity will not be increased 
Three flexibility issues 
Addressing three flexibil-
ity issues  
Flexibility in the allocation of free allowances typically addresses the follow-
ing issues: 
 
 Adjusting the benchmarks 
 Responding to dynamic activity levels 
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 Meeting the cap 
Based on a thorough analytical analysis of design option for dynamic allo-
cations in Chapter 7, we summarise the various reform options, differenti-
ated through their level of flexibility. 
 
Benchmark flexibility Benchmarks need flexibility because of changes in technologies which in 
turn quite often reflect investment cycles. It may be necessary, therefore, to 
update benchmarks at different intervals, depending on the sector. 
By ranking installations based on their emissions performance, benchmarks 
could be considered to represent an incentive. 
The benchmark process will result in the share of emissions to be allocated 
as free allowances. This share will also define benchmark intensity for free 
allocation, i.e. the amount of free allowances allocated to a unit of activity. 
Benchmarks may be determined as in the current procedure by ranking in-
stallations based on their emissions intensity. For more targeted bench-
marks, other criteria, such as explicit indicators for trade intensity, indirect 
emissions, currently not avoidable process emissions, etc. could be taken 
into account. 
 
Flexibility with respect to 
activity levels 
Allowing free allocation to respond to activity levels is considered to be im-
portant in avoiding cost distortions among installations.  
Design options that incorporate flexibility to reflect activity levels are based 
on recent, or actual, output data. Similarly, other approaches could be con-
sidered which are linked to compensation based on emissions that corre-
spond to the installation benchmark. This design might be attractive from 
an administrative point of view, since the determination of flexible alloca-
tions could be integrated into the auditing procedures. 
 
Flexibility with respect to 
emissions caps 
Flexibility in determining free allocation has to be reconciled with the overall 
cap on emissions. The current approach provides for fixed shares from free 
allocation and auctioning. 
A more flexible design could consider restricting only the overall emissions 
cap, but allowing for variation in the share of free and auctioned allowances. 
It should be noted that the October Council Conclusions state that the share 
of auctioning in total allocation should not be reduced. This, in some inter-
pretation, could limit the design choices for flexible designs. 
3.2.4 Reform options for the flexible allocation of free allowances 
Reform options for flexi-
ble designs 
There are different options that can be developed for the allocation of free 
allowances, depending on the degree of flexibility that is allowed, and they 
are outlined in this section. These options are independent of previously 
made benchmark decisions. 
 
Reform Option 2.2.1: Partially flexible allocations with capped free allowances 
without a compensating reserve  
Flexible free allocations 
are compensated by an 
adjusted correction factor 
Free allowances are allocated by allowing flexibility with respect to activity 
levels and benchmarks. 
free allocation = recent benchmark x recent activity level x 
                           adjusted correction factor 
Since the total volume of free allowances is capped, a correction factor is 
used for adjusting for the difference between the calculated free allocation 
and the volume of free allocations allowed under the cap. 
The auctioned volume remains fixed. 
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 This design maintains over a period a fixed ratio between flexible and auc-
tioned allocations. Free allocation respond to activity levels, and discrepan-
cies from the total free allocation available under the cap are adjusted ex 
post through a correction factor. 
 
Figure 3-6 Flexible allocations of free allowances without a compensating reserve 
 
Source: Authors. 
 
Reform Option 2.2.2: Partially flexible allocations with capped free allowances and 
compensating reserve 
Flexible free allocations 
are compensated by a re-
serve 
Free allowances are allocated by allowing flexibility with respect to activity 
levels and benchmarks. 
free allocation = recent benchmark x recent activity level 
Since the total available volume of free allowances is capped, the difference 
between the calculated free allocation and the caped volume is in this sce-
nario adjusted via a reserve. The MSR could be used for this purpose. 
 
 Also this design as visible in Figure 3-7 maintains over a period a fixed ratio 
between free and auctioned allocations. Any discrepancies between actual 
and target free allocations are ex post compensated via the MSR. 
This design does not need a correction factor. 
 
Figure 3-7 Flexible allocations of free allowances with compensating reserve 
 
Source: Authors. 
 
Reform Option 2.2.3: Fully flexible allocations with capped total allowances and 
compensating reserve 
Both free and auctioned 
allocations are flexible 
Free allowances are allocated by considering flexibility with regard to the 
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compensated by a reserve activity levels and benchmarks. 
free allocation = recent benchmark x recent activity level 
Only the total volume of allowances is capped. The auctioning volume is ex 
post adjusted to the difference between the total overall cap and free allo-
cations. 
The difference between actual total allocations and the total volume is ad-
justed via a reserve, such as the MSR. 
 
 This design offers as can be seen from Figure 3-8 flexibility in the ratio be-
tween free and auctioned allocations. The stringency of the overall alloca-
tion is maintained by ex post adjustments of the auctioning volume. No cor-
rection factor is needed. 
Figure 3-8 Flexible allocations of free allowances with compensating reserve and adjusted auction-
ing volume 
 
Source: Authors. 
3.2.5 Conclusions from adding flexibility to allocations 
 
Advantages from the flexi-
bility of allocations 
For installations the stringency of free allocations, defined as the share of 
free allowances relative to their total emissions, is a key determinant for 
evaluating emissions costs. 
The current practice with respect to free allocation generates a number of 
negative impacts: 
 reductions in activity levels have within defined thresholds (so-called 
partial cessation rules) no impact on the allocation of free allowances, 
i.e. the stringency of free allocation is varying with activity levels, 
 the correction factor reduces increasingly over time the amount of free 
allowances without differentiating between sectors 
 the historical  benchmarks could become outdated. 
The switch from historic to more recent activity levels reduces the variation 
of the stringency of free allocation at the installation level, and therefore 
eliminates a lot of uncertainty with respect to the impacts of carbon costs 
resulting from output fluctuations. 
Variations in the amount of free allocations can be fully, or partially, adjusted 
through the variations in the auctioning volume. This eliminates the need 
for a correction factor and will allow emissions to fluctuate around the target 
path. 
Provisions need to be made, however, to avoid actual emissions staying 
over a longer period above the target path, and thus violating the environ-
mental target. 
 
Market stabilisation and 
target path adjustments 
Basically all mechanisms for stabilising the carbon market, such as the 
MSR, or dynamic free allocation, follow a design that is depicted in Figure 
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by adjusting the auction-
ing volume 
3-9. 
 Market imbalances are determined by comparing target path emissions 
with actual emissions and are addressed through adjustments in the 
supply of allowances. 
 Liquidity requirements result from hedging and other trading opera-
tions, and provisions need to be made for that. 
 The supply is split between free allowances and the volume to be auc-
tioned. 
This adjustment can be done for fixed trading periods, as in the current set-
up of the EU ETS, in shorter intervals, or annually, as in the proposed MSR 
and flexible allocations. 
 
Figure 3-9 Flexible free allowances in view of a long-term target path 
 
Source: Authors. 
 
Three typical adjustment 
needs 
We obtain further insights into flexible supply mechanisms by considering 
three typical adjustment needs: 
 Case 1: Current imbalances fluctuate around the target path 
 Case 2: Current imbalances remain below the target path 
 Case 3: Current imbalances remain above the target path 
 
Case 1: Imbalances fluctu-
ate around target path 
If imbalances just fluctuate around the target path as depicted in Figure 
3-10, supply flexibility maintains the market stringency by responding each 
year to previous imbalances. 
In this case the actual emissions will just fluctuate around the target path 
and no significant deviations from the implicit emissions cap will occur. 
 
Figure 3-10 Imbalances fluctuate around target path 
 
Source: Authors. 
 
 
 
Case 2: Imbalances re-
main below target path 
So far the carbon market for the EU ETS has exhibited systematic imbal-
ances below the target path. According to the supply flexibility proposal, 
adjustments can be made both by changing the supply of free allowances 
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and/or the auctioned amount.  
Since in this case actual emissions will remain under the implicit emissions 
cap as illustrated in  
Figure 3-11, the emissions target will be over-fulfilled. 
This procedure does not only avoid the accumulation of surpluses, but also 
maintains the stringency of the carbon market. 
 
Figure 3-11 Imbalances remain below target path 
 
Source: Authors. 
 
Case 3: Imbalances re-
main above target path 
Additional considerations need to be given to the case of imbalances that 
are caused by actual emissions that exceed the target path over a longer 
period as indicated in  
Figure 3-12. 
This case leads to the risk that the implicit emissions cap specified by the 
target path will not be met. There are a number of options for reducing this 
risk. 
 We can rely on the price mechanism, since persistent shortages on the 
carbon market will increase the carbon price and thus make abatement 
options more attractive. 
 We can limit the amount of supply adjustments and thus increase the 
scarcity of allowances which in turn triggers a higher carbon price. 
 We can increase the activities in overlapping policies from renewables 
and energy efficiency in order to reduce the imbalances. 
 We might want to put a ceiling on the carbon price in order to prevent 
excessive carbon costs. This should, however, be reconciled with the 
current Art.29a mechanism, which allows for an adjustment of the auc-
tioning schedule in case EUA prices remain significantly higher than in 
the preceding years. 
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Figure 3-12 Imbalances remain above target path 
 
Source: Authors. 
 
Pros and cons Flexible supply of free allowances enables to respond to changes in output 
and technologies, and therefore avoids horizontal imbalances among in-
stallations. 
Is there a risk that flexibility in the number of free allowances, which interact 
with the volume of auctioned allowances, might have a crowding-out effect 
on this volume, i.e. the remaining auctioning volume might be judged be-
coming too low? 
The share of free allocations for industry, the only sectors eligible for free 
allocations in the long-term (if they are considered to be at risk of carbon 
leakage), is currently less than 30 percent of total EUA supply. Since the 
remaining sectors, which represent mainly electricity and heat, will be able 
to continue with a higher reduction of the emissions intensity than industry 
sectors, there is little risk that expansions of industry output might have ad-
verse impacts on the auctioning volume that is relevant for the remaining 
sectors. However, all this implies that the burden of emissions reductions 
shifts to sectors that obtain their allowances via auctions. 
Nevertheless, in the long-term perspective, environmental integrity has to 
be ensured even in prolonged periods of economic growth. 
What’s new 
  Recent activity levels are used together with updated benchmarks for 
determining the allocation of free allowances. 
 There is no need any more for a Cross-Sectoral Correction Factor. 
 Switching to flexible supply mechanisms that are based on long-term 
target paths eliminates the need for explicit fixed trading periods. 
 
3.3 Reform Package 3:Further elements to enhance the functionality of the 
EU ETS 
 A number of additional reform options are currently being mentioned and 
deserve to be reflected upon and mentioned. 
Targeted allocation of free allowances 
A more targeted allocation 
of free allowances 
The allocation of free allowances can be made more effective by revising 
the factors that determine the amount for free allocation is calculated. 
 These could be elements of an allocation procedure that either comple-
ments or substitutes the current benchmark-based procedure: 
All industry sectors are eligible for free allocations, based on a flexible and 
sector-specific allocation mechanism that is based on 
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- exposure to export competition 
- exposure to import competition 
- process emissions  
- indirect emissions via use of electricity 
It should also be considered to always combine trade and emissions-related 
criteria, as both are required for carbon leakage to actually materialise. 
 
Implementing the targeted 
supply of free allowances 
This reform option addresses the current uniform treatment of sectors con-
cerning the allocation of free allowances once they are on the carbon leak-
age list. 
A potential advantage of this procedure is the explicit consideration of the 
factors relevant for the risk of carbon leakage as indicated in Figure 3-13. 
In order to meet the target path any necessary adjustment to the supply of 
allowances would be done via the auctioning volume. A sectoral correction 
factor would be redundant in this case. 
 
Figure 3-13 Targeted supply of free allowances 
 
Source: Authors. 
 
Explicit criteria for allocat-
ing free allowances 
The allocation is based on a set of transparent criteria which can be se-
lected either on sector or even installation level and updated over time. 
 Exposure to international competition 
Free allowances are allocated proportional to the share of exports and 
imports related to the volume of production that corresponds to actual 
emissions. 
 Process emissions 
Those emissions which result from industrial processes, can’t be re-
duced with current technologies, are fully or partially compensated by 
free allowances. 
 Indirect emissions 
The spillover effects of emissions in the power sector via electricity 
costs on other sectors can be compensated with free allowances. 
 
What’s new  Targeted free allocations explicitly consider and compensate for (com-
binations of) trade exposure, indirect emissions and emissions from 
processes. 
 All installations are eligible for free allowances based on transparent 
and flexible rules. 
 There is no need any more for a Carbon Leakage List. 
Different sectoral targets 
 As can be seen from Figure 3-11, the distribution of emissions by sector in 
the EU ETS market is dominated by combustion sectors compared to a 
rather small share of industry sectors. This classification may point at dif-
ferences in abatement capabilities, the risk to carbon leakage but also to 
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divergent interests as to the size of a carbon price. 
This could motivate the split, within a single EU ETS, of an overall reduction 
target into different sectoral targets, which would be used for adjusting the 
sector-specific free and auctioned volumes but maintain the unitary ETS. 
 
Design of different sec-
toral target paths 
Based on the observed division of the market for the EU ETS allowances, 
different reduction targets could be considered for power and non-power 
sectors. Same could be done for different industrial sectors. 
Further sectoral differentiation is possible according to abatement capabili-
ties. 
 
Implementation of differ-
ent sectoral target paths 
These different sectoral targets could be used together with flexible allow-
ances as the auction volume would be adjusted for each sector. The condi-
tion precedent is that we would still have a unitary carbon market. 
 
Figure 3-14 Sector shares of emissions 
Source: Authors. 
Different treatment of compensation for indirect carbon costs 
 
The issue of state aid 
 
In the current EU ETS Directive, compensation for indirect carbon costs is 
only possible through state aid, which Member States may grant at their 
own discretion on an ex-post basis. While the EC has adopted harmonised 
guidelines for such state aid, the approach as such has considerable dis-
advantages with respect to mitigating carbon leakage risk. As it considered 
operating aid, the aid needs to be tapered over time. 
 
Options for compensation Different Member States may also have different fiscal capacities and will-
ingness to grant aid, leading to an uneven playing field for indirect carbon 
cost compensation. Some options to create a more level playing field could 
be considered: 
 Compensation could take place at EU level, by extending free alloca-
tion to include indirect carbon costs. This adds some complexity, how-
ever, and it would be unclear how such a mechanism would relate to 
state aid. 
 Auctioning revenues could be used to compensate indirect carbon 
costs. Specifically, a model like in California might be considered, 
where electricity generators use the proceeds from auctioning to com-
pensate the higher prices which result from passing through carbon 
costs. Such a system would mean moving away from the state aid ap-
proach altogether. 
 
Different treatment of small installations 
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Highly unequal distribu-
tion of the size of installa-
tions 
Figure 3-15 reveals the highly unequal size distribution of installations cov-
ered by the EU ETS. 84 percent of the smaller installations account for only 
10 percent and 71 percent for only 5 percent of total EU ETS emissions. 
This highly unequal distribution as to the size of installations could justify a 
different treatment of the smaller installations.  
 
Design of a different treat-
ment for smaller installa-
tions 
A reform option for smaller installations could be an emissions charge that 
is based on the consumption of fossil energy and multiplied with an annually 
adjusted rate which reflects the carbon content and previous year’s average 
carbon price. 
 
Figure 3-15 The highly unequal size distribution of installations 
 
Source: Authors. 
Inclusion of upstream distributors 
 
 Distributors of fossil energy could be included into EU ETS as it is done in 
California. This could be also an option for dealing with small installations. 
In the Californian scheme, electrical distribution utilities receive allowances 
for free, yet they must use the auctioning revenue to compensate their cus-
tomers for the higher electricity costs as these are passed through. 
 
Governance issues 
Rule-based flexibility 
might not be sufficient 
There are many reasons why just some rule-based flexibility might be not 
sufficient for maintaining a desired state of the carbon market. Since the co-
decision procedure required for changes to the ETS Directive can take sig-
nificant amounts of time, which thereby creates a lot of uncertainty not ben-
eficial to the carbon price signal, the use of delegated governance proce-
dures could be considered.  
Use of EU credits 
Create a link between the 
ETS and non-ETS sectors 
Currently Article 24a of the EU ETS Directive states that EU Member States 
can adopt measures for issuing allowances from projects not covered by 
the EU ETS. This aspect is not on the front burner of the agenda for the EU 
ETS structural reform. In the current existing glut new supply is hardly 
needed. However, in the context of a package, a link between the ETS and 
non-ETS covered sectors covered could be an interesting avenue to ex-
plore. This also needs to be looked in the context of debate over a more 
dynamic based allocation and potential additional burden on non ETS sec-
tors  
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4 Framing a structural EU ETS reform with new perspectives on 
carbon leakage 
 An important experience with the EU ETS was the insight that this policy 
instrument cannot be judged and handled independently from other EU pol-
icies or from global economic conditions. 
This insight has a strong bearing on the evaluation of the risk of carbon 
leakage, and on the harmonisation needs with other policies. 
4.1 An extended view of the interactions on the carbon market 
The non-operational con-
cept of marginal abate-
ment costs 
Carbon markets at the outset of the design of the EU ETS were understood 
as an interaction between marginal abatement costs and an emissions cap 
with a resulting carbon price as indicated in Figure 4-1.  
For several reasons this understanding of the carbon market has turned out 
not being operational because of the underlying information requirements. 
One of the constraints is that marginal abatement costs may not be well-
defined because they depend on the time horizon and assumptions about 
a wide range of factor prices, including financing options. In many cases 
marginal abatement costs just cannot be singled out from other effects if, 
e.g., complex production processes are involved.  
Given this uncertainty about marginal abatement costs on the level of in-
stallations, the market is confined to delivering credible signals about these 
costs. 
In most cases the required conditions for a well-defined (and for all market 
participants visible) marginal abatement cost curve do not hold. But only if 
these optimal conditions, among others, prevail a well-defined cap would 
determine a transparent price signal to ensure the cost effectiveness of the 
system in the short and long run. 
Figure 4-1 A simplistic of the carbon market 
 
Source: Authors. 
 
 Meanwhile it has turned out, that the interactions on the carbon market are 
much more complex as Figure 4-2 suggests. 
 The physical stringency between supplied and demanded allow-
ances is meant to be the main determinant of the carbon price, aside 
from the motivations of actors on the financial market. 
 Direct carbon costs are the product of the carbon price times the num-
ber of allowances needed. 
 Additional costs occur from abatement activities which in turn have a 
feedback on the stringency of allowances. 
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 Overlapping policies, such as those for renewables and energy effi-
ciency, have an impact both on abatement costs and the physical strin-
gency of allowances. 
 The effectiveness of carbon costs have at least three components: 
the direct carbon costs and the abatement costs, as well as indirect 
carbon costs, which result from purchases of electricity with a carbon 
content. 
 Ultimately it is the change in the value added that finally determines 
the impact of complying with carbon targets, which in turn depends on 
the ability to shift carbon costs to the price of the product. 
 
Figure 4-2 The interactions on the carbon market 
 
Source: Authors. 
4.2 Facts on the stringency of the carbon cap for carbon leakage 
 
 We complement this enhanced conceptional understanding of a cap-and-
trade system with some empirical evidence of the EU ETS which adds to 
our understanding of carbon leakage issues. 
 
Share of free allocation in 
verified emissions 
From the point of view of a single installation the physical stringency of a 
carbon cap can be measured by the share of free allocation in verified emis-
sions. 
 
In Period 1 and 2 the vol-
ume of free allocation ex-
ceeded verified emissions 
This indicator is visible for all sectors in Figure 4-3 and reveals, that both in 
Period 1 and in Period 2 there was an excess of free allowances compared 
to verified emissions. 
Because of a change in the allocation method in Period 3 starting with 2013 
the share of free allocation dropped to 45 percent of verified emissions and 
43 percent of total supply which includes also the auctioning volume. Re-
markably, also, in 2013 total supply of allowances exceeded the volume of 
verified emissions by almost 5 percent. 
 
Combustion sector was 
short whereas industry 
sector was long of free al-
lowances 
 
There are significant differences with respect to the share of free allocations 
between the combustion and fuel sector (which account for about 71 per-
cent of emission), and the remaining industry sectors. 
The industry sector so far had a surplus of free allowances over verified 
emissions, whereas the combustion sector was short, as can be seen from 
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Figure 4-4.  
This pronounced fragmentation of the EU ETS sectors has a strong bearing 
in the evaluation of carbon leakage. With exception of a few installations, 
the industry sector has so far not experienced a physical stringency of al-
lowances at the installation level. More details about industry sectors can 
be found in the Appendix. 
 
Figure 4-3 Share of free allocation in verified emissions – all sectors 
 
Source: European Environment Data and European Union Transaction Log, own calculations. 
Figure 4-4 Share of free allocation in verified emissions – combustion and industry 
 
Source: European Environment Data and European Union Transaction Log, own calculations. 
 
So far EU ETS has only 
faced very low carbon 
costs 
This evidence of the physical stringency of free allocation indicates that both 
in Phase 1 and in Phase 2 there was an oversupply of free allowances 
compared to verified emissions, which was even more pronounced for the 
industry sector.  
Phase 3 reduced significantly this share of free allowances but together with 
the volume of auctioned allowances total supply of allowances exceeded 
verified emissions in 2013. 
The impact of this supply surplus resulted in overall lower carbon costs than 
predicted by, for example, impact assessments of the Commission, which 
frequently make reference to carbon prices of 30EUR per EUA. 
This does not exclude that individual installations faced significant cost im-
pacts because of adverse effects resulting from the allocation of free allow-
ances. These distortions result in particular from the allocation of free al-
lowances which within thresholds are independent from output levels. 
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4.3 Reform elements for shielding against carbon leakage 
4.3.1 Structural reforms of the EU ETS relevant for carbon leakage 
 Using this extended view of the interactions on the carbon market we obtain 
additional insights how the risk of carbon leakage can be avoided. 
 
Carbon price, costs and 
technological change 
For a given carbon price it is the technology, represented by the emissions 
intensity, which determines the direct carbon costs. Any measures that sup-
port improvements of the carbon intensity are obviously highly relevant. The 
assumption of optimal theoretical market conditions would ensure that just 
the carbon price would deliver the required technological changes. In real-
ity, however, an unstable carbon price – which might meet opposition from 
stakeholders and policy-makers, depending on the level – might not be suf-
ficient to trigger radical technology switches. 
 
More targeted allocation 
of free allowances 
One option to reduce direct carbon costs is the allocation of free allow-
ances, as has been practiced in the EU ETS. There are many reasons, 
however, to do this in a more targeted way than in the current set-up which 
more or less treats all sectors that are on the carbon leakage list in a uniform 
manner. 
A more targeted approach to the allocation of free allowances would explic-
itly consider the exposure to trade outside the EU, process emissions from 
industrial processes, as well as indirect emissions. 
 
Supporting targeted tech-
nology policies from the 
auctioning revenues  
In the long run it will be most important to support the transition to low-
carbon technologies for which strategic decisions are already set today.  
Since carbon prices might not provide sufficient incentives for embarking 
on such strategies, additional support for research and development will be 
needed. Necessary financial resources could be mobilised from auctioning 
revenues beyond the volume allocated for this purpose so far. 
Figure 4-5 Factors relevant for the risk of carbon leakage 
 
Source: Authors. 
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4.3.2 Overlapping policies 
Renewables and energy 
efficiency 
Research points at the fact that the EU ETS has been influenced by other 
EU policies, in particular those for renewables and for improving energy 
efficiency. 
There is still further analysis needed, on how a particular carbon price af-
fects the energy mix or vice versa, as well as how a particular renewables 
policy impacts the carbon market. 
Some of these interactions point at a rather surprising and even counter-
productive result. The subsidies for renewables e.g. not only lowered the 
demand for fossil fuels but also lowered the wholesale price for electricity 
and made electricity generation from coal cheaper and electricity from gas 
not competitive anymore. This calls for a fundamental rethinking of the mar-
ket design for heat and power in view of the carbon price signal. 
4.3.3 Targeted technology policies 
Visionary low-carbon op-
tions for energy intensive 
industries need targeted 
technology policies 
Abatement options in particular for the industry sectors will heavily depend 
on new technologies which in most cases will be radically different from 
current processes. 
This holds in particular for iron and steel, where ultra-low carbon technolo-
gies can be envisaged, but are still far away and need a major commitment 
for research and development and pre-commercial testing. 
Similar breakthrough technologies seem to be possible for cement in terms 
of the emissions intensive clinker content and the re-use of carbon emis-
sions from clinker production. 
Rather obvious are new options for paper and pulp where the technology 
roadmaps indicate the way to bio-refineries. 
These technology options will very likely not be mobilised just by a carbon 
price. They require a highly targeted commitment in terms of goals and re-
sources. Parts of the auctioning revenues would be an obvious source for 
supporting these targeted technology policies. 
4.4 Framing a structural reform strategy for the EU ETS 
The future of the EU ETS  
 The experience with the EU ETS so far and its current state open several 
future strategies, and continues to raise the issue whether it should be evo-
lutionary or revolutionary: 
 No reform actions. 
This will lead to a further increase of the already huge surplus of allow-
ances which would harm the effectiveness of the EU ETS and damage 
the credibility of this policy instrument. 
 Reform actions as proposed by the European Commission. 
Because the proposed MSR, according to the EC proposal will not be-
come effective before 2021 (this is currently under debate), this will not 
stop the build-up of additional surpluses by 2020, and might afterwards 
still maintain excessive surpluses even until 2030. 
 Structural reforms for enhancing the proposed reform actions. 
Based on the operating experience obtained so far with the EU ETS 
more ambitious reform actions could be envisaged for strengthening 
this policy instrument. 
Targets and stakeholders 
Reaffirming the intentions 
of a structural reform 
At the outset of discussions about reform strategies it might be worth re-
membering the fundamental objectives of this policy instrument: 
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 Meeting a long-term environmental target by complying with an 
emissions reduction path to 2050. 
 Providing a clear prices signal that would influence economic asset 
allocation. This translates into a clear, consistent and credible carbon 
price signal, as well as other incentives for catalyzing transformations 
in the energy and industrial sectors. 
 Avoiding carbon leakage by shielding energy intensive industries 
from the adverse impacts of carbon costs, as long as no comparative 
actions are put in place outside the EU. 
 
Considering stakeholder 
interests 
Seemingly divergent stakeholder interests have emerged. Some electricity 
producers consider an EU ETS with a high carbon price as a means for 
driving out coal from the electricity market. Compared to other sectors the 
power and heat sector can rather easily shift carbon costs to end consum-
ers. 
Industry sectors, however, if they are facing international competition on 
import and export markets, are vulnerable with respect to high carbon 
prices. 
 
Observing political feasi-
bility 
It seems difficult to find a political consensus for a comprehensive reform of 
the EU ETS 
 
Steps for designing a structural reform of the EU ETS 
 This analysis of the current state of the EU ETS, and the lessons learned 
since its implementation in 2005, as well as the steps for a reform of this 
policy could have the following elements. 
 
Responding to market im-
balances 
Priority in all reform strategies needs to be given to the reduction of the 
imbalance in the carbon market that accumulated since 2008, and to mak-
ing in the future the supply of allowances more responsive to changes in 
demand, irrespective of what drives these demand changes. The expected 
impact of such reform actions is a gradual increase of the carbon price 
which in turn would strengthen incentives for switching to low-carbon tech-
nologies. 
This could be achieved with activities which were summarised in Reform 
Package 1. A core element is a Market Stability Reserve which needs a 
careful evaluation with respect to its parameters for intervention and the 
timing of introduction.  
 
Adding flexibility and a 
long-term perspective to 
allocations 
A long-term perspective to installations could be given by a long-term emis-
sions target path as suggested by the European Commission. Both free and 
auctioned allocations can be based on this target path. These allocations 
can be made flexible through updated benchmarks and outputs, thus linking 
abatement efforts with activity levels. Together with the MSR, this would 
ensure compliance with the environmental target. 
These reform elements are the substance of Reform Package 2 which sug-
gests switching from fixed trading periods to flexible allocations along a 
long-term target path but maintaining the stringency of the carbon market. 
 
 
Enhancing further the 
functionality of the EU 
ETS 
These two basic reform packages could be further enhanced by additional 
reform elements which are summarised in Reform Package 3. 
Priority deserves a more targeted allocation of free allowances by explicitly 
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compensating the exposure of export and import competition, currently un-
avoidable process emissions, and indirect emissions contained in the pur-
chase of electricity. These indirect costs are still a problem without a satis-
factory solution. It needs to be addressed at the EU level 
What a structural reform could achieve 
 In total such a structural reform of the EU ETS would exhibit a number of 
new designs compared to the current set-up: 
 Allocation would exhibit more flexibility without compromising the envi-
ronmental target. 
 All sectors would benefit from a more predictable carbon price. 
 Energy-intensive industries would face a better targeted carbon leak-
age protection and allocation of free allowances. 
This added flexibility would also change the administrative requirements. 
Because of the added flexibility there is no need for fixed trading periods 
with related problems at the boundary years, no need for a cross-sectoral 
correction factor and also no need for a carbon leakage list if explicit criteria 
for the allocation of free allowances are used. 
 
5 Emissions trading in a global context 
 
 An increasing number of countries and regions around the world are devel-
oping and implementing emissions trading schemes as a means to place a 
price on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Trading schemes are now in 
place or are being planned in Europe, North America, South America and 
throughout the Asia Pacific region.  
Since Copenhagen 2009, achieving consensus on emissions mitigation 
through multilateral negotiations has been difficult. Momentum appears to 
have shifted from the international level to that of nation states and regions. 
A particularly strong dynamic is visible in rapidly developing and transition-
ing economies, with new trading systems under discussion, or being put in 
place in China, India, Brazil, South Korea and Vietnam.  
5.1 Existing and emerging schemes 
 Globally, 39 national and 23 sub-national jurisdictions have implemented or 
are scheduled to implement carbon pricing instruments, including emis-
sions trading systems and taxes. The Chinese pilot systems form the 
world's second largest carbon market after the European Emissions Trad-
ing Scheme (EU ETS), covering the equivalent of 1,115 million tonnes of 
carbon dioxide emissions compared to the EU ETS with 2,084 million 
tonnes in 2013 (World Bank, 2014). 
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Figure 5-1 Overview of emerging emissions trading schemes 
 
Source: World Bank (2014). 
 
 Both in the US and Canada national schemes were planned but so far they 
have not been implemented. However, regional schemes are emerging. 
The EU ETS is the largest emissions trading market, followed by smaller 
ETS such as in New Zealand and the US regional Greenhouse gas initiative 
(RGGI) or the Canadian provincial scheme in Alberta. A strong dynamic to 
implement an ETS can be observed in Asia, even if at the same time Aus-
tralia chose to repeal its ETS. 
5.1.1 Emissions trading in North America 
 
 In North America no ETS have been implemented on a federal level, but 
regional ETS have emerged both in the US and Canada. 
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) 
RGGI The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI): a state-level emissions 
trading system in the North East US that started trading on January 1, 2009. 
It is covering CO2 emissions only from power generation. RGGI represents 
the first mandatory CO2 cap-and-trade program in the United States. RGGI 
covers fossil-fuelled electric power plants greater than 25 megawatts (MW) 
located in any of the nine participating states (EIA, 2014). CO2 emissions 
in the RGGI region accounted for 4% of the total emissions from the electric 
power sector in the United States in 2012. 
 The cap was tightened in 2014 primarily because actual CO2 emissions in 
the region since 2009 have been roughly 35% below the cumulative cap. 
This lower level of emissions is partially attributed to low natural gas prices, 
which have shifted a large share of electricity generation in the region to-
ward natural gas, but also to lower overall electricity demand (EIA, 2014). 
In 2005, when CO2 emissions in the RGGI states reached peaked, coal 
accounted for 23% of the regional generation mix and petroleum accounted 
for 12%. By 2012, coal's share had declined to 9%, while the natural gas 
share had risen from a 25% share in 2005 to 44%. Petroleum's generation 
share in the region fell below 1% by 2012 (EIA, 2014). 
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Western Climate Initiative (WCI) 
WCI The Western Climate Initiative (WCI) is an initiative of US states and Cana-
dian provinces to develop emissions trading systems. Currently only Cali-
fornia and Quebec have implemented trading systems, and trading formally 
started on January 1, 2013;   
 The basic structure of the WCI is a decentralised cap-and-trade program in 
which jurisdictions cooperate to design individual systems that can be linked 
to create a single market (Tuerk et al., 2013). Each jurisdiction is responsi-
ble for setting its own cap in light of the regional aim of a 15% reduction of 
2005 GHG levels by 2020. While some general guidelines for establishing 
jurisdiction-specific caps were agreed upon, these guidelines were ex-
tremely broad in the hopes that flexibility in this regard would facilitate 
greater participation (Tuerk et al., 2013). However, prior to linking one juris-
diction’s system to another, each would have the opportunity to review the 
others jurisdiction’s program to assess its consistency with the program de-
sign.   
Within the jurisdiction in which it is adopted, the coverage of the cap and 
trade scheme is very high. In the initial phase of development, the majority 
of large-emitting installations in all industrial and power sectors would be 
included, and transportation and commercial sectors are due for inclusion 
in the second phase (Tuerk et al., 2013). Between 85% and 90% of total 
GHG emissions in the participating sectors would be covered in the second 
phase which, in theory, would start in 2015. In participating jurisdictions all 
installations emitting over 25.000 tCO2e per year would be included in the 
scheme. The basic guidelines of the WCI allow for some cost containment 
measures, including allowance reserves, limited borrowing, and auction 
floor prices, but exclude hard price caps and unlimited borrowing as con-
tained in some of the earlier proposals for a federal US cap-and-trade sys-
tem. 
 Table 1 shows the current positions of the 11 WCI partners. Depending on 
the final participants in the scheme the WCI could account for about 800 
mega-tonnes of CO2e per year, over half of which represent emissions from 
California. 
 
Table 5-1 Summary of WCI jurisdictions' current positions on cap-and-trade regulation 
Cap-and-trade regulations 
adopted 
Expressed interest but 
no regulations 
Will not be implementing 
cap- and- trade 
California Ontario Montana 
Quebec British Columbia Utah 
 Manitoba  
 Washington  
 Oregon New Mexico 
  Arizona 
Source: Based on Tuerk et al. (2013). 
 
5.1.2 Korean Emissions Trading Scheme 
Korean ETS The Korean ETS is set to start in January 2015. The draft National Alloca-
tion Plan (Korean) includes five sectors: power generation, industry, public 
water and waste utilities, buildings, and transport (mainly domestic avia-
tion). Around 500 entities will be covered by the ETS.  
While the allocation of allowances should generally not be changed during 
an allocation period, readjustments of allocations can be made to help cov-
ered firms “in the event of an important change in the economic situation 
which could not be predicted at the time of setting up the allocation plan.” 
The readjustment can take two forms:  
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 First, in exceptional cases, important changes in the overall economic 
situation might lead to an increase in the total volume of emissions al-
lowances. 
 Second, businesses may request readjustments by drawing on reserve 
allowances. However, the criteria under which businesses may request 
additional allowances are limited to three circumstances: (a) when 
emissions increase over the allocated allowances due to an unex-
pected expansion of a firm’s facilities or the transfer/merger of a fac-
tory; (b) if emissions of a power-generating facility have increased due 
to the Government’s request for increased power generation; and (c) if 
a firm’s emissions have increased by more than thirty percent over its 
allocated allowances due to an unexpected change in the product line 
or business plan (Hawkins et al, 2014). 
 According to current plans for the South Korean ETS, the Government will 
be allowed to intervene with market-stabilising measures in case of signifi-
cant changes in prices or trading volumes. The plans stipulate the situations 
under which such interventions are permitted and the type of measures that 
can be taken. Stabilisation measures are authorised if one of following sce-
narios applies (Hawkins et al., 2014).  
 First, when the price for allowances increases more than threefold for 
six straight months compared to the previous year or the year before 
that.  
 Second, when the average price increases more than twofold com-
pared to the average allowance price of the past two years because 
the trade volume increased more than twofold in a one month period 
compared to the average monthly volume of the previous year or the 
year before that.  
 Third, when there is a 60% price decrease in a one month period com-
pared to the average prices of the past two years.  
In those cases, the Government has permission to take the following 
measures to stabilise the market: (a) auction up to 25 percent of permits 
from the reserve; (b) set a maximum or minimum limit for the holding of 
allowances by each participant; (c) increase or reduce the borrowing limit; 
(d) increase or reduce the offset limit; or (e) set the highest or lowest prices 
(Hawkins et al., 2014). 
5.2 The Chinese pilot schemes 
5.2.1 The regions involved 
 China is implementing several pilot emissions trading systems. The Na-
tional Development and Reform Commission announced its plan to develop 
seven official ETS pilot programs (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Chongqing, 
Guangdong, Hubei and Shenzhen) in 2011.This plan began to be imple-
mented from 2013. By October 2014, six of the seven pilot schemes started 
trading started operation with the remaining one – Chongqing – due to start 
in late 2014. China plans to implement a national scheme from 2016. 
China’s strategy has been to mandate creation of several pilot trading sys-
tems with different designs, allowing it to compare experiences prior to de-
ciding on an approach for a future nationwide system. Before the specific 
systems will be discusses some main design options are presented. 
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Figure 5-2 Emerging emissions trading schemes in China 
 
Source: Climate Group (2014) 
 
 For most of the involved industrial entities and commercial buildings, overall 
allowances are determined in accordance with their historical record over 
the period from 2009 to 2011. In case the growth rate over these three years 
is higher than 50%, the emissions level of 2011 will be taken as a bench-
mark. Power generation, aviation, harbour and airport sectors will take their 
allowance according to specific sectoral emissions benchmarks for per unit 
of production activity, which is further multiplied by their historical average 
activity level over the period from 2009 to 2011. The allowances are grand-
fathered in a lump sum fashion for the period from 2013 to 2015; however, 
borrowing allowances from subsequent years for compliance purposes is 
prohibited. 
 
5.2.2 Synthesis of design features of Chinese pilot schemes 
 Pilot emissions trading schemes vary across cities and regions, in terms of 
caps and targeted sectors in order to provide a solid basis for implementing 
a unique and national wide emissions trading scheme.  
Beijing is the only pilot that requires annual absolute emissions reductions 
for existing facilities in the manufacturing and service sectors. Companies 
in these sectors will receive fewer allowances each year—starting with 98% 
of their average 2009-2012 emissions in 2013 and dropping to 94% in 2015.  
The other ETS don’t require absolute reductions, but a reduction of carbon 
intensity per unit of Industrial added value. Shenzhen and Tianjin allow in-
dividual investors and entities that are not covered by the ETS, such as 
financial institutions, to participate in trading, resulting in higher trading fre-
quency and potentially larger price fluctuations.  
Focusing only on CO2, the pilots cover roughly 40 to 60 percent of a city or 
province’s total emissions, and apply to power and other heavy manufac-
turing sectors such as steel, cement, and petrochemicals. 
 
Figure 5-3 Overview of emerging emissions trading schemes: covered entities, cap, trade volume 
Structural reform of the EU ETS   47 
and trade amount 
 
Source: Zhong (2014). 
Allocation 
 The standard method for distributing allowances in China is grandfathering 
based on historical emissions data in the past few years, while sectoral 
characteristics and mitigation costs are taken into consideration as well.  
In most cases the cap is an emissions intensity cap. For the purpose of 
price management and cost containment, the local governments of Tianjin, 
Shanghai and Hubei may reserve some allowances.  
At the same time, auctioning may be used as a complementary method in 
Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Shenzhen, and Guangdong pilots for a small 
portion of allowances (Calderon, 2013). Shenzhen plans to increase the 
portion towards full auctioning in the future. Hubei is unique in that it will 
reserve 20% of initial allowances for early action rewards (Calderon, 2013). 
In the Chinese ETS the majority of the allocation is free and based on grand-
fathering; Apart from power and heat, benchmarking has not been deployed 
at a large scale (Ecofys, 2014). However two of the ETS, Shenzen and 
Guangdong started to experience with a small amount of auctioning. 
Figure 5-4 Schemes with intensity based allocations 
 
Source: Zhong (2014). 
Sectoral coverage 
 An important difference between the ETS in China and the EU ETS (and 
other OECD trading schemes) is the intention to cover the building sector 
(e.g. Beijing), or in some cases also the transport sector. The Chinese Min-
istry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development (MOHURD) has developed 
different options for carbon trading for the building sector (Han, 2102). The 
options are about to be tested in a handful of pilot cities. 
While MOHURD’s primary intention is to limit the amount of energy that is 
being wasted, the extension of a carbon trading scheme to the building sec-
tor has to be aligned with China’s overall climate change strategies. At the 
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moment, MOHURD is among the first to present detailed options for a car-
bon trading scheme among the sectoral ministries (Han, 2102).). Since 
electricity prices are heavily regulated in China, power plants cannot pass 
their carbon costs on to consumers through electricity prices. This policy 
therefore provides little incentive for demand-side electricity management. 
To address this issue, the Chinese pilots also require large electricity users 
to submit emissions permits to the government. Therefore, also indirect 
emissions are covered by most Chinese ETS. 
Market stabilisation and offsets 
 Most Chinese schemes consider to set aside permits to regulate the market, 
e.g. to buy / sell allowances in case of market fluctuation. Regarding the 
use of offset credits, the Chinese trading schemes allow the use of Chinese 
Certificated Emissions Reductions (CCER). Depending on the scheme, this 
can go up to 10% of total supply. 
Market prices (in Yuan) 
 Figure 5-5 shows that the market prices have a range of 20-80 Yuan in early 
2014 (2,6-10,4 Euro) and between 25 and 55 Yuan in late 2014 (3,24-7,15 
Euro). The price ranges currently are similar to the ranges of the EU-ETS. 
Figure 5-5 Overview of market prices in the Chinese pilot schemes so far (in Yuan) 
 
Source: Zhong (2014). 
 
5.3 Comparison of design features of the EU ETS with other ETS worldwide 
 
 Existing and emerging trading schemes are very different regarding design 
features such as scope of the systems or allocation methods. 
 
Sectoral coverage While the EU-ETS focuses on industry and large energy producers, and 
ETS schemes in the US and Canada have similar coverage, some of the 
emerging schemes in Asia try other avenues often involving smaller facili-
ties, buildings, or include indirect emissions from energy consumption as 
well. 
 
Type of targets While schemes in the US, Canada or Europe have absolute caps the Chi-
nese pilot ETS have relative caps, sometimes complemented by absolute 
caps. 
 
Allocation method Only few ETS worldwide use auctioning as a primary allocation method 
from the system’s inception. Similar to the EU-ETS where grandfathering 
was used in the beginning, the Chinese ETS pilots allocate most allowances 
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for free. 
 
User of offset credits All existing and emerging systems allow the use of offset credits, but do so 
to very different amounts and following different international or national 
standards. 
 
Market stabilisation 
measures 
Most ETS, in contrast to the EU-ETS, provide market stabilisation measures 
to manage price fluctuation and give more price certainty to included com-
panies. 
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7 Appendix 1:  
Dynamic allocation in EU ETS under different design options 
 We discuss different design options for allocating free allowances based on 
actual activity levels and focus in particular on procedures which lower the 
administrative burden. 
7.1 Overview of procedures for activity based allocations of free allowances 
7.1.1 Static free allocations 
Based either on historical 
emissions or historical ac-
tivity levels 
The current procedure for free allocation is static (apart from the partial ces-
sation rules which allow for some rough adjustments) and can be repre-
sented either in relation to historical emissions by 
(F1)  fixed free allocation =  
    benchmark share of free allowances x historical emissions x 
    correction factor 
or in relation to historical activity levels by 
(F2)  fixed free allocation =  
    benchmark intensity x historical activity level x  
    correction factor 
 
Cross-sectoral correction 
factor 
In the current set-up a so-called cross-sectoral correction factor (CSCF) is 
needed in order to meet the capped total volume of free allowances. 
7.1.2 Flexible free allocations 
 Some proposed reform options (e.g. from Ecofys, 2014) aim for flexible free 
allocation which respond to actual activity levels. We provide an argumen-
tation that flexible free allocation, which are also referred to as dynamic or 
output-based, can y be framed either in relation to actual activity levels as 
mentioned above or – as we add to this discussion – to actual emissions 
adjusted for benchmark requirements. Both representations open different 
design options for implementing such a dynamic allocation procedure. 
Based either on actual 
compensated emissions 
or actual activity levels 
A dynamic procedure for free allocations to installations can also be based, 
either on actual emissions that are adjusted for the benchmark require-
ments 
(D1)  flexible free allocation =  
    benchmark share of free allowances x  
    actual benchmark emissions 
or in relation to actual activity levels by 
(D2)  flexible free allocation =  
    benchmark intensity x actual activity level 
 
 Flexible free allocation so far have been mainly discussed in the activity 
based representation (D2). However, also considering representation (D1), 
which is emissions based, opens new options for implementation. Discus-
sion of a CSCF is omitted; as such a correction may become redundant in 
a reformed allocation procedure. 
7.2 An analytical framework for activity based allocations of free allowances 
 
Notation We introduce for our analytical framework the following notation: 
 C  carbon emissions (volume) 
 F  free allocations (volume) 
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 Q  activity level (volume of production) 
 (C/Q) emissions intensity 
 s  share of free allowances (F/C) 
 i  free emissions intensity (s∙C/Q) 
The following subscripts are used: 
 t  year t 
 B  benchmark period related 
7.2.1 Current and other design options for allocating free allowances 
Linking free allocations to emissions or to activities 
 Free allocation F can either be linked to emissions C or to activities Q meas-
ured as the volume of production. 
For a given share s of free allowances F in total emissions C, which reflects 
the outcome of any procedure for allocating free allowances, we can relate 
free allowances to emissions: 
(1)  F = s∙C   with 0 ≤ s ≤ 1 
By substituting C with the emissions intensity (C/Q) and activity Q we obtain 
an equivalent representation of free allowances proportional to activities: 
(2a) F = i∙Q 
with the free emissions intensity i being defined as the free emissions per 
unit of activity; 
(2b) i = s∙(C/Q) 
Current benchmark procedure for determining free allocations 
 In the current set-up of EU ETS the procedure for free allocation is based 
on benchmarks which are related to emissions intensities. Each installation 
reports for a benchmark reference period B, emissions CB, and activity lev-
els QB. Using this information, emissions intensities (CB/QB) are calculated 
and ranked. The share sB of free allowances per unit of activity is deter-
mined based on the position of an installation relative to all other installa-
tions in the subsector. Top performing installations with a low emissions 
intensity ratio (CB/QB) obtain 100 percent free allowances while the remain-
ing installations, depending on their ranking, receive less. This procedure 
therefore contains an incentive element. 
For a particular installation free allocations are determined analogous to (1) 
as either proportional to emissions 
(3)  FB = sB∙CB 
or alternatively according to (2) as proportional to activity levels 
(4a) FB = iB∙QB 
with the benchmark intensity for this installation 
(4b) iB = sB∙(CB/QB) . 
Other benchmark procedures for determining free allocations 
 Free allocation could be made more focused by explicitly basing the volume 
of free allocations on trade intensities, on indirect emissions via electricity 
consumption, or on emissions from industrial processes that currently can-
not be avoided. 
For a predetermined reference period B such a procedure will yield the vol-
ume of free allocations FB for known emissions CB and known activity level 
QB. With this information a regime for free allocations being well defined, 
following (3) the share of free allowances sB and from (4b) the benchmark 
intensity iB results. 
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7.2.2 Fixed allocations of free allowances 
 Currently, the EU ETS uses a procedure for free allocations that is based 
on a reference period and remains fixed over a trading period. The alloca-
tion procedure can be represented by (3) as 
(F1)  fixed free allocation =  
    benchmark share of free allowances x historical emissions x 
    correction factor 
or by (4) as 
(F2)  fixed free allocation =  
    benchmark intensity x historical activity level x  
    correction factor  
 
Deficiencies of this proce-
dure 
This procedure for determining free allocation is being debated at least on 
two grounds. First, the volume of free allocation within only a few, far-apart, 
thresholds does not respond sufficiently to changes in output levels and 
thus creates distortions among installations with different dynamics in their 
activities. Second, the so-called cross sectoral correction factor reduces the 
degree of mitigation against carbon leakage risk. 
7.2.3 Flexible or dynamic allocations of free allowances 
 We assume that for a certain time span benchmarks are predetermined ei-
ther by the benchmark share of free allocations sB according to (3) or the 
benchmark intensities iB as defined in (4b).  
Similar to the basic relationships (3) and (4), between free allocations and 
emissions and activities respectively, we arrive at the following two equiva-
lent representations for the allocation of flexible free allocation. 
For each year t the free emissions FB,t that are compatible with the prede-
termined benchmark regime are calculated as a proportion of the bench-
mark emissions CB,t: 
(5a) FB,t = sB∙CB,t 
with benchmark emissions being defined by the benchmark emissions in-
tensity (CB/QB) and actual activities Qt: 
(5b) CB,t = (CB/QB)∙Qt 
Similarly, for each year t the free emissions FB,t that match the benchmark 
regime can be presented proportional to the actual activities Qt: 
(6a) FB,t = iB∙Qt 
with benchmark intensities iB defined as in (4b), namely 
(6b) iB = sB∙(CB/QB) 
 
 The volume of free allocations in a flexible allocation system can therefore 
be represented in view of (5) as 
(D1)  flexible free allocation =  
    benchmark share of free allowances x  
    actual benchmark emissions 
or, in an equivalent way, in view of (6) as 
(D2)  flexible free allocation =  
    benchmark intensity x actual activity level 
 
Both representations of free allocations can be used for implementing 
mechanisms that respond to fluctuations in activity levels. 
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7.3 Design options for activity based allocations of free allowances 
 The implementation of a flexible mechanism for free allowances comprises 
two steps: the determination of the benchmark restrictions and the calcula-
tion of the volume of free allowances. 
Determination of the benchmark restrictions 
 Free allowances are allocated according to benchmark restrictions which in 
turn need to be determined only once for a predetermined time span during 
which these restrictions remain unchanged. 
For a reference period B, installations need to report emissions CB and ac-
tivity levels QB and obtain in return the volume of free allocations FB, irre-
spective of the rules that are applied. 
This information is sufficient for determining the benchmark share sB of free 
allowances: 
(7a) sB = FB/CB 
or, in a similar way, for obtaining the benchmark emissions intensity iB which 
uses, in addition to the share of free allowances sB, information about the 
emissions intensity∙(CB/QB) in the reference period: 
(7b) iB =sB∙(CB/QB)  
In addition, the actual benchmark compensated emissions CB,t are needed, 
i.e. the emissions that are compatible with the benchmark restriction for ac-
tual activity levels Qt, by multiplying the emissions intensity (CB/QB) of the 
benchmark with actual activity levels: 
(7c) CB,t = (CB/QB) Qt  
These benchmark compensated emissions CB,t may deviate from the actual 
emissions Ct if the benchmark restrictions are not fulfilled. 
Calculation of the flexible free allocations 
 There are two design options for determining the volume of free allocation 
for installations. 
Observing the benchmark restrictions, for each year the volume of free al-
location for an installation is found, either by applying the benchmark share 
of free allocations to the actual benchmark emissions:  
(8a) FB,t = sB∙CB,t  
or by applying the benchmark emissions intensity to actual activity levels: 
(8b) FB,t = iB∙Qt  
Although (8a) and (8b) obtain identical results, it is representation (8a) 
which may substantially ease the implementation of a flexible allocation of 
free allowances since this requires only data about actual emissions, but 
does not require data about activity levels.  
The administrators only need to provide to installations (once; as part of the 
benchmark procedure) a table or formula such as (7c) that indicates which 
emissions volumes correspond to various activity levels under the valid 
benchmark restrictions. As part of the validation of emissions by auditors, 
he volume of free allocations can be determined right away. 
A cross-sectoral correction factor can be applied if this is still part of the 
allocation procedure for free allowances. 
Robustness of this mechanism for flexible free allocations 
 We check how this mechanism for flexible free allocations reacts to devia-
tions from the benchmark restrictions by replacing in (8a) benchmark emis-
sions by actual emissions Ct and in (8b) benchmark intensities by deviating 
intensities it: 
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(9)  Ft = sB∙Ct = it∙Qt = sB∙(Ct/Qt) Qt = FB,t∙[(Ct/Qt)/(CB/QB)] 
From installations expected free allocations Ft obviously differ from the 
benchmark compatible free allocations FB,t which will be actually allocated. 
The term in square brackets will become greater than one if actual emis-
sions intensities (Ct/Qt) increase compared to the benchmark intensities 
(CB/QB) and become less than one if there is an improvement. This means 
that in case emissions intensities increase, installations will need to pur-
chase additional allowances, whereas a reduction of emissions intensities 
will create a surplus of allowances that can be sold. Thus this mechanism 
has the desired property of maintaining incentives, i.e. installations will be 
motivated to reduce their emissions intensities. 
Conclusions and caveats 
 Flexibility in free allocations refers to benchmarks and to activity levels. It is 
expected that benchmarks are revised less frequently than activity levels.  
Benchmark characteristics are determined based on information from a his-
torical reference period. The essential information needed is the volume of 
free allocations in relation to the volume of actual emissions. The procedure 
is neutral with regard to different ways the volume of free allocations is de-
termined. The current set-up of EU ETS uses a ranking of emissions inten-
sities. Modified set-ups could take into account explicitly trade intensities, 
indirect emissions and process emissions. 
We demonstrated that for a given benchmark regime, an allocation proce-
dure that allows the volume of free allowances to respond to activity levels 
can be based either on benchmark compensated emissions without having 
explicit information about activity levels or use explicit information about 
those activities. The former mechanism for flexible free allocations offers 
design options that may ease the implementation and substantially lower 
the administrative burdens.  
Whatever design option is chosen, benchmark procedures always require, 
however, a periodic review of the benchmark parameters taking into ac-
count sectoral differences. 
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8 Appendix 2: Key data of EU ETS 
8.1 Database 
Table 8-1 All countries – Overall position 
 
 
  
All Countries                                   [kt CO2] 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
All installations 
Total EUA allowances 2,096,444 2,078,546 2,154,880 2,011,070 2,051,352 2,089,763 2,109,672 2,179,737 2,001,248
Auctioned or sold 0 6,782 1,730 53,130 79,315 91,862 92,943 125,034 1,135,627
Freely allocated 2,096,444 2,071,764 2,153,151 1,957,940 1,972,037 1,997,901 2,016,729 2,054,703 865,621
Verified emissions 2,014,077 2,035,789 2,164,732 2,119,676 1,879,611 1,938,884 1,904,517 1,867,162 1,904,129
Freely allocated  scope corrected 2,266,030 2,235,127 2,315,415 2,064,858 2,078,955 2,104,819 2,123,647 2,161,621 865,621
Verified emissions scope corrected 2,183,663 2,199,152 2,328,747 2,226,594 1,986,529 2,045,802 2,011,435 1,974,080 1,904,129
Totel surrendered units 1,645,271 2,384,787 2,151,843 2,104,966 1,910,682 1,931,014 1,887,323 1,874,879 1,909,567
Surrendered EUAs 1,645,271 2,384,787 2,151,843 2,021,380 1,829,846 1,793,862 1,633,697 1,382,134
Surrendered Offsets 0 0 0 83,585 80,836 137,153 253,625 492,745
Surrendered CERs 0 0 0 83,536 77,605 117,037 177,832 213,944
Surrendered ERUs 0 0 0 49 3,231 20,116 75,794 278,801
All combustion of fuels
Freely allocated 1,488,420 1,466,122 1,530,331 1,286,712 1,294,407 1,316,158 1,331,697 1,363,083 278,970
Verified emissions 1,478,765 1,491,336 1,576,238 1,534,071 1,397,430 1,432,680 1,398,216 1,389,341 1,355,816
All industrial sectors
Freely allocated 608,025 605,642 622,819 671,228 677,630 681,743 685,032 691,620 586,651
Verified emissions 535,312 544,453 588,494 585,605 482,181 506,204 506,302 477,821 548,313
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Table 8-2 All countries – Industry sectors (1) 
 
 
 
  
All Countries                                   [kt CO2] 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
All refining of mineral oil
Freely allocated 157,161 156,340 158,788 148,149 148,285 152,713 152,216 155,038 105,242
Verified emissions 148,756 147,289 148,989 150,387 141,947 139,591 138,336 133,391 134,159
All production of coke
Freely allocated 22,789 22,789 22,789 22,597 22,573 22,912 22,620 22,641 21,535
Verified emissions 19,193 21,301 22,074 21,039 15,786 19,984 19,528 16,811 23,045
All metal ore roasting or sintering
Freely allocated 14,851 14,910 15,083 4,464 4,229 4,265 4,285 4,301 3,000
Verified emissions 7,036 8,293 8,610 4,109 2,751 3,640 3,960 3,848 3,496
All production of pig iron or steel
Freely allocated 140,787 140,226 141,041 169,174 169,414 169,464 170,600 170,677 139,532
Verified emissions 114,412 117,092 117,200 119,758 83,936 100,804 99,901 97,520 100,971
Production or processing of ferrous metals
Freely allocated 2,987 3,011 3,428 3,861 3,896 3,951 3,986 3,989 9,925
Verified emissions 3,078 2,949 3,353 3,128 2,062 2,280 1,907 1,962 9,985
Production or primary aluminum
Freely allocated 433 433 512 470 470 471 474 474 6,704
Verified emissions 298 277 346 367 273 283 306 341 6,935
Production of secondary aluminum
Freely allocated 108 108 108 84 84 84 84 84 866
Verified emissions 69 83 74 58 26 24 21 15 926
Production or processing of non-ferr. met.
Freely allocated 20 20 125 116 116 116 116 116 5,742
Verified emissions 21 21 40 39 40 46 39 84 5,348
All production of cement clinker
Freely allocated 177,310 176,344 186,581 196,009 197,538 198,987 198,802 200,457 156,043
Verified emissions 164,802 169,103 186,771 176,795 142,587 142,116 140,783 130,885 129,327
Production of lime, calcination of magnesit
Freely allocated 10,778 10,778 11,758 13,387 13,863 13,892 13,912 13,900 10,351
Verified emissions 10,099 10,490 11,496 11,885 9,035 10,313 10,529 9,772 10,280
All manufacture of glass
Freely allocated 22,194 22,175 22,548 24,884 25,183 25,315 25,735 25,802 17,653
Verified emissions 19,921 19,818 21,147 22,496 19,174 19,993 20,546 19,547 18,819
All manufacture of ceramics
Freely allocated 17,926 18,100 18,229 18,327 18,581 18,669 18,236 17,811 14,915
Verified emissions 14,814 14,955 14,947 13,355 9,115 8,983 8,961 7,941 12,816
All manufacture of mineral wool
Freely allocated 174 174 197 280 271 305
Verified emissions 146 146 192 205 231 415
Production or processing of gypsum
Freely allocated 205 205 205 205 205 803
Verified emissions 173 150 154 159 154 954
Production of pulp
Freely allocated 3,163 3,162 3,162 2,407 2,369 2,367 2,386 2,424 2,698
Verified emissions 1,976 1,961 1,943 1,857 1,734 1,753 1,676 1,711 1,747
All production of paper or cardboard
Freely allocated 34,292 34,494 34,929 36,937 37,780 38,631 38,767 39,482 29,382
Verified emissions 28,525 28,646 28,042 30,550 27,136 29,215 28,074 26,907 26,065
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Table 8-3 All countries – Industry sectors (2) 
 
 
 
  
All Countries                                   [kt CO2] 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Production of nitric acid
Freely allocated 0 0 251 251 218 2,353
Verified emissions 0 0 64 48 53 1,592
Production of adipic acid
Freely allocated 485
Verified emissions 142
Production of amonia
Freely allocated 1,773 1,773 2,619 1,074 2,446 1,840 1,702 1,599 12,245
Verified emissions 1,404 1,331 1,886 1,107 1,041 1,157 1,404 1,393 13,687
Production of bulk chemicals
Freely allocated 1,223 757 835 6,019 6,297 6,158 6,158 6,158 19,300
Verified emissions 750 698 730 5,648 5,366 5,358 5,183 5,358 13,374
Production of hydrogen and synthesis gas
Freely allocated 7,332
Verified emissions 7,150
Production of soda ash and sodium bicar.
Freely allocated 4,378
Verified emissions 1,878
Other activity opted-in under Art. 24
Freely allocated 228 222 285 22,758 23,994 21,124 24,084 25,839 15,608
Verified emissions 158 148 20,845 22,596 19,771 20,122 24,608 19,791 25,021
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8.2 Share of free allocation in verified emissions by industry sectors 
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